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Abstract. 
This study investigates how a change in the fees charged by the JSE onto members to trade stocks affects 
various metrics of market quality. This topic falls within the broader subject of market microstructure, 
which considers how frictions in trading can affect both the costs and behaviour of investors. It primarily 
relates to the issues of market structure and design, along with the issues of price discovery and price 
formation. Work in related areas has shown that changes in market design can affect market efficiency 
and integrity. The overall result of this work does seem to partially corroborate with those previous studies 
in finding there are some identifiable changes in a subset of the metrics of market quality that are 
examined. The most striking result is a reduction in incidents of market manipulation post the change in 
exchange fees. Overall instability in bid/ask spreads makes drawing any conclusions around implicit 
transaction costs difficult. However, there is some evidence of lower transaction costs amongst the largest 
market capitalisation stocks. 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Introduction 
For a long time, the issue of frictions in financial markets had been ‘largely ignored’ (Stoll, 2000) with many 
models simply assuming the presence of a ‘Walrasian auctioneer’ that ensured competitive markets 
automatically cleared at their equilibrium price and quantity.  However, over the past 30-odd years, there 
has been a growing interest in the process by which prices are determined in markets – a subject that has 
taken on the name of market microstructure (Madhavan, 2000). Work in the field of market 
microstructure has shown how the design, structure and rules of a stock exchange can affect topics as 
diverse and important in finance as the level of asset returns (Jones, 2002), market efficiency in 
disseminating information (Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam, 2008) and price volatility. The fees that a stock 
exchange charges market participants to trade are an example of a possible friction in the process of price 
formation.  This study investigates the impact of a change in the fees that the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange Limited (JSE) charges its members to trade on various metrics of market quality.   
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides a background to the study by discussing the 
study of market microstructure and the operations of the South African equity trading environment. This 
is then followed by a formal problem statement, the research questions and the research objectives that 
the study seeks to address in section 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 respectively.  A short discussion of the data and 
proposed methodology follows in section 1.6. Section 1.7 presents the outline of the thesis and the 
chapter summary concludes the chapter. 
1.2 Background to the study 
The change in JSE fees charged to members to trade in equities represents a potential friction that is 
studied within the field of market microstructure. This section provides background on both the broad 
field of market microstructure in sub-section 1.2.1, as well as more detail on the JSE itself and how it fits 
into the broader South African trading environment in sub-section 1.2.2. 
1.2.1 Market Microstructure  
The study of market microstructure covers a fairly broad range of topics and areas.  Two key areas of 
research include both matters of market structure, as well as matters relating to price formation and price 
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discovery.  Market structure focuses on the design, trading rules and protocols of a market and how these 
factors affect the process of price determination. The area of price formation and price discovery 
considers aspects like transaction costs and also how prices change over time to convey new private and 
public information.  Other matters that fall within the ambit of market microstructure include both market 
transparency and the linkages between market microstructure and other areas of finance (Madhavan, 
2000). 
Decisions around how to structure and organize markets are not immaterial.  For example, a study of a 
phased-in change in market type on the Tel-Aviv Stock exchange found a positive market-adjusted 
additional return of ~5.5% in the 30 days after the change (Amihud, Mendelson & Lauterbach, 1997). The 
most common structure used to conduct trading in equity markets is a continuous auction market (de 
Jong & Rindi, 2009), which may also be complimented with call auction markets at set points during the 
day. Crossing networks have grown in importance, with a study of the US market in 2008 finding that 
nearly 30% of all equity volumes occurred away from traditional exchanges (O’Hara & Ye, 2011).  The 
potential lack of transparency in crossing networks has created some regulatory concerns (Michaels, 
2014), but it has also been suggested that the crossing networks may help reduce trading costs by making 
it easier to locate uninformed traders (Madhavan, 2000). 
The investigation and study of the issues of price formation and price discovery has tended to focus 
around issues of inventory management and asymmetric information. Early inventory management 
models involved looking at how market makers adjust their pricing and spreads in response to deviations 
of current inventory levels away from their optimal levels (Biais, Glosten & Spatt, 2005). Later models 
moved on to focus on matters of asymmetric information. These later models, such as that of Kyle (1985), 
are normally based around the interactions of informed traders, noise traders and market makers. 
Informed traders are held to have some level of better information about the real value of the share and 
can use this to earn a profit by trading with market makers.  These models often focus on the process by 
which private and new information is transmitted and incorporated into the market price.    
The analysis of transaction costs is subsumed within the topic of price formation and price discovery.  
Transaction cost analysis in equity markets has traditionally focused on the costs faced by investors.  These 
costs are normally divided in two parts, with the early literature establishing a clear line between explicit 
and implicit transaction costs (Demsetz, 1968).  Explicit costs are made up of all the various taxes, fees 
and commissions that an investors faces when buying or selling shares.  These costs are normally easy to 
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identify and, if the data is available, simple to measure.  Implicit costs are more contentious.  They consist 
of all other costs that are not included in the final invoiced price paid by the investor.  In line with the 
original work by Demsetz (1968), the use of bid/ask spreads in measuring implicit costs remains popular 
(Pollin & Heintz, 2011).  The literature splits this spread into three distinct components of cost.  The 
components are order processing costs, inventory management and asymmetric information (de Jong, 
Nijman & Roell, 1995). It should be noted that an exclusive focus on bid/ask spreads to measure implicit 
costs is not without controversy.  One of the key problems with bid/ask spreads is the increased 
importance of institutional investors in equity markets. This class of investor has been a major driver of 
the growth in trading volumes in US markets (Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyam, 2010).  Institutional 
investors typically trade in large size, with orders that can take several days to complete (Chan & 
Lakonishok, 1995).  With such large orders, the bid/ask spread is not a precise measure of the cost of 
trading immediately (Grossman & Miller, 1988). Alternative measures of implicit costs that have been 
suggested include implementation shortfall (Bessembinder, 2003; Anand, Irvine, Puckett & 
Venkataraman, 2012) as well as VWAP and the mean of the open/high/low/close (Domowitz, Glen & 
Madhavan 2001).  A significant problem with these other measures is that they generally require access 
to the private order data of investors.  Such data is very often not available, or only available with a long 
lag. 
Algorithmic trading and high-frequency trading (HFT) has attracted growing interest from the academic 
community, as computer-based trading systems have taken on an ever more prominent role in financial 
markets. This ‘rise of the machines’ has been a key change in the market structure in recent years, with 
one estimate finding that as much as 73% of the volume that traded in US markets in 2009 originated 
from computers (Hendershott, Jones & Menkveld, 2011).  HFT on its own is now thought to be anywhere 
from 40% to 85% of daily trade in the US (Huh, 2014). These developments have not been without 
controversy, as events such as the Flash Crash of 2010 and the fall of Knight Capital after a computer 
system error show.  Michael Lewis’s recent book ‘Flash Boys’ has also not helped the public image of the 
HFT industry. A central theme of the book is that HFT firms receive an unfair advantage over regular 
traders. This advantage reportedly comes from some stock exchanges that provide HFT firms with 
preferential access to systems and order types that allow them the ‘skip the queue’ (Sukumar, 2014).    
The academic literature around algorithmic trading and HFT continues to struggle towards consensus. 
Hendershott and Moulton (2011) found that a dramatic increase in the speed and automation of trade in 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) raised effective bid-ask spreads through higher risks of asymmetric 
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information, although it did improve price efficiency. A separate study of the London and Paris Stock 
Exchanges found that algorithmic trading caused average trade size, value and bid/ask spreads to fall.  It 
also found that the market was more informationally efficient (Aitken, Aspris, Foley & Harris, 2014). HFT 
strategies can be divided into liquidity-taking (aggressive) strategies and liquidity-provision (passive) 
strategies.  Liquidity-taking strategies revolve around speed, attempting to react before others to a 
profitable event. Studies on aggressive strategies have generally found that they increase the adverse 
selection and trading costs of others.  Liquidity-provision strategies operate more like high-speed market 
makers, and studies of these strategies have mainly found that they result in narrower bid/ask spreads 
and more informationally-efficient prices (Baron, M., Brogaard, J. & Kirilenko, A., 2014).  A study of the 
NASDAQ market found that HFT increased market quality in periods of both normal and falling markets 
(Hasbrouck & Saar, 2013).  However, the study could not discount the possibility that HFT could worsen a 
crisis during periods of severe market dislocation.  Huh (2014) comes to a similar conclusion, highlighting 
that liquidity-providing strategies provide less market making activities when markets are volatile. In 
essence, liquidity-providing HFT’s have seemingly taken on much of the role of traditional market-makers. 
But in times of crisis, they may withdraw from the market and weaken the process of price formation - 
right at the time when they are needed the most. 
1.2.2 The South African Equity Trading Environment 
The South African equity market is structured along the same lines as most global equity markets.  It is 
important to distinguish between the roles played by investors and brokers as it is relevant to the question 
of who bears the costs and benefits of a change in exchange fees. After this, key aspects of the JSE are 
discussed. This is followed by a short description of how trading in equities is conducted on the exchange.     
Investors are responsible for making specific decisions about which asset classes and specific instruments 
to buy and sell. This is done with the goal of maximizing their return for a given level of risk that they are 
willing to assume. Institutional investors are typically dominant in this process in South Africa, pooling 
assets from individuals, corporates and governments and making investment decisions on their behalf.  
The Association for Savings and Investment SA (2013) identifies a value of R 1,373 billion worth of assets 
under professional management by South African funds (as of 31 December 2013).  These assets are fairly 
heavily concentrated, with the 7 biggest fund managers representing ~56% of total assets in the industry 
(Cairns, 2013). It is relevant to note that South African fund managers are subject to exchange controls, 
which were designed and implemented to limit capital outflows from the country.  The nature and extent 
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of these controls have been gradually relaxed over time.  But they still limit the amount that a fund 
manager can invest outside of South Africa to no more than 25%-30% of total assets.  The exact levels 
allowed to be invested in foreign assets largely depends on how the fund is classified (Leape & Thomas, 
2011).     
Both retail and institutional investors typically rely on brokers to help them to buy/sell shares on a stock 
exchange. Brokers are private firms that provide investors with research and trading services.  They are 
normally members of the major stock exchanges in the countries in which they operate. They use their 
exchange membership to trade on behalf of investors in return for commission payments. Brokers may 
also choose to provide formal or informal market making services. There is a growing trend for brokers to 
provide their clients with electronic systems to enable them to trade for themselves onto the exchange 
(this is called direct market access or DMA). Irrespective, as it is always the broker’s system that interfaces 
directly with the exchange, any fees and charges from the exchange are levied onto the broker. The 
commission between investor and broker is established separately in a private contract.  These fees are 
generally set in a long-term contract rather than being negotiated on a transaction-by-transaction basis 
(Goldstein, Irvine, Kandel & Wiener, 2009). 
For investors in South Africa, the JSE is the only venue available for executing equity transactions in most 
listed stocks.  This stands in sharp contrast to the trend in developed markets such as Europe and the U.S.  
In these markets, regulatory changes driven by policies such as the EU’s Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) has led to the establishment of multiple execution venues for a single stock (‘A bigger 
bang’, 2014).  This market fragmentation has been the subject of several studies, with findings that it may 
compress bid-ask spreads, lower trading fees and improve execution speeds (O’Hara & Ye, 2011).  One 
important finding from a JSE perspective is that having a single central order book for a stock typically 
raises transaction costs (Colliard & Foucault, 2012).  While the situation of a single central order book does 
characterise trading in many South African stocks, it should be noted that several of the larger and more 
liquid stocks listed on the JSE are fully fungible with listings on exchanges in other countries.  The presence 
of these dual-listed counters (DLCs) is an important feature of the JSE equity market.  Additionally, a 
number of JSE-listed companies also have actively traded American Depositary Receipt programs in the 
US (notably the gold miners).  Nonetheless, the existence of only a single trading venue in South Africa 
means that investors often do not have a choice between competing trading venues with differing cost 
schedules.  Even in the case where a stock is also listed on a foreign market, there are a number of 
frictional impediments to trading in another venue.  These include the explicit costs of transacting in these 
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markets, along with potential foreign exchange risk, ADR conversion costs (which are typically material) 
and any costs arising from the mismatched settlement cycles (such as financing and borrowing costs).    
 The JSE is a fully electronic, order-driven market.  The rules of the JSE state that they only accept orders 
from the electronic systems maintained by members of the exchange, but they do allow broker/members 
to offer investors a DMA service.  The trading day is divided up into auction phases and periods of 
continuous trading.  Exact statistics are difficult to determine, but volume during all the auction phases is 
generally no more than 20% of the total volume on the day.  During the periods of continuous trading, 
traders can submit electronic buy and sell orders into a central order book.  These orders can specify a 
limit price, or can be entered ‘at market’.  If a buy order with a limit is entered (called a limit buy or limit 
sell from here), the trading system will match them against any limit sell orders that have been previously 
placed with a sell limit below or equal to the buy limit.  The total number of shares that will trade in this 
matching process depends on the number of shares requested on both the buy and sell order, with the 
system seeking to maximise the total number of shares that trade in each transaction.  Any residual 
amounts that are left over after the matching process will stay in the central order book at their respective 
limits.  They will remain in the order book until they either get completed in a subsequent transaction, 
expire, or are cancelled by the trader.  In the event that a limit buy (or sell) order matches against several 
sell (or buy) limit orders, the JSE trading system will match them in order of price-time-visibility.  Hence, 
in the case of sell orders, the sell order with the lowest limit will be filled first, followed by the second 
lowest limit price and so forth.  Should there be two or more sell orders entered with the same limit price 
in the central order book, the orders will be filled based on time – with the order entered first being filled 
first and so on. 
Market orders work in slightly different fashion.  A market buy order entered into the system will 
immediately match with each existing limit sell order in the system until the total volume in the market 
order has been satisfied. In general, a market order will execute the full number of shares placed in the 
order and so potentially limit any opportunity costs of trading.   However, the market impact costs of 
these orders can be high as they do not set a maximum price limit.  There are two scenarios in which a 
market order may not execute in full on the JSE.  This first is when there is an insufficient total volume 
available across all the opposing limit orders.  For example, if a buyer wants 10,000 shares total at market, 
but the total volume of limit sell orders for the stock is only 5,000.   The second possibility is when the 
price impact of the market order is sufficiently large enough to trigger the JSE’s circuit breakers.  In this 
case, the market order will buy (or sell) as much as possible up to the price that triggers the circuit breaker.  
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On the JSE, circuit-breakers are triggered when the price moves more than a certain pre-defined 
percentage amount from either the previous traded price or from the previous day’s closing price.  These 
percentage levels are based on JSE’s size classification of the share. 
 Auctions are conducted at the start (between 08:30 to 09:00) and end (between 16:50 to 17:00) of each 
trading day.  Stocks with a small market capitalisation (designated as ZA03 by the JSE) also have an 
additional auction at midday (between 12:00 to 12:15).  The stated goal of the midday auctions is to 
improve liquidity in these stocks. Auctions are also conducted whenever there is a move in a share price 
that triggers one of the JSE’s circuit breakers. These auctions are designed to reduce volatility and find a 
fair price at which to continue trading in the stock.  During an auction period, traders can enter both limit 
and market orders, but nothing trades until the end of the auction period or the ‘uncrossing’.  When the 
auction closes, the trading system makes use of a volume maximising calculation to determine the final 
price and volume of shares that trades in the auction.  The sequence in which orders are filled continues 
to be based on the rules of price-time-visibility priority, with market orders considered to have price 
priority over limit orders. Throughout the auction, the JSE publishes an indication of the expected price 
and volume at which the share will uncross to market participants.  This is based on the existing orders 
entered into the system at that point in time.      
On the 30th of September 2013, the JSE introduced a notable change in the billing model that it uses to 
charge members for equity transactions. The notice of this change was originally issued by the JSE on the 
1st of July 2013 and is reproduced in Appendix A.  Prior to the change, the exchange charged a variable fee 
per transaction, based on 0.0055% of the value of the transaction with a minimum charge (floor) of R4.00 
and a maximum charge (ceiling) of R20.00 per transaction.  The fee was charged on each transaction (or 
‘hit’) on the exchange, irrespective of the number of shares ordered.  Hence, an order could be entered 
to buy 1,000 shares, but such an order could result in multiple transactions if the seller only sold a few 
shares at a time.  This created a perverse situation where the exchange fee charged per transaction could 
actually be more than the value of the transaction itself (assuming the stock price was low enough).  From 
the 30th of September 2013 onwards, the JSE removed the minimum floor per transaction and reduced 
the variable value to 0.0053% of the transaction.  It slightly compensated for this by increasing the 
maximum charge to R300.  Thus, it became cheaper for brokers to transact in smaller trade sizes and this 
could also provide liquidity. The aim of this study is to assess and analyse the impact of the 30th September 
2013 change in the JSE billing model on measures of market quality. 
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1.3 Research Problem 
Exchange fees charged to market participants are a potential source of friction to the efficient formation 
of market prices and can impact the overall level of market quality as measured by market efficiency and 
market integrity. These changes in market quality can arise as market participants respond to a change in 
fees by adapting their trading behaviour. Exchange fees may also affect net asset returns through the 
channel of implicit transaction costs. The recent change in exchange fees charged by the JSE was 
implemented only after extensive consultation with market participants. However, the impact of this 
change on the overall quality of the market remains an open question. This study provides an attempt to 
fill this gap by measuring for any changes in a number of traditional metrics of market quality. A deeper 
understanding of this topic will contribute to the existing literature on market design. This may help 
provide future guidance for decision makers in trying to achieve the optimal design and level of regulation 
of financial markets.  
1.4 Research questions 
Specific questions that this study will seek to answer include: 
 Did the change in the JSE billing model result in any changes in implicit transaction costs faced by 
investors. 
 Did the change in the JSE billing model cause a change in overall liquidity. 
 Did the change in the JSE billing model result in a change in the level of market integrity. 
1.5 Objectives of the study 
The aim of this study is to determine whether the change in exchange fees resulted in any impact on 
measures of market quality. The specific objectives are as follows: 
 To investigate whether the new JSE billing model has resulted in a change in implicit transaction 
costs to investors. 
 To establish whether the new JSE billing system had an impact on measures of overall liquidity; 
on the level of market integrity, and on overall market quality. 
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 To investigate whether the change has affected the general behaviour of market participants and 
the impact of the change on their returns. 
1.6 Data and Methodology 
The data required for this study is based on public information generated by trading activity on the JSE.  
The frequency of the data is on both a daily and intraday basis and it is sourced primarily from the 
Bloomberg Professional service.  The general method of analysis used is a trend analysis to examine 
various measures of market quality before and after the change in the JSE’s billing model. Where possible, 
the results for the JSE will be compared to those of another market over the same period to attempt to 
isolate the impact of the change in JSE exchange fees. To better capture any potential changes in market 
quality, the stocks will be segmented in two separate ways – firstly by share price and then also by market 
capitalization. 
Market quality will be examined within a framework of market efficiency and market integrity (Harris & 
DiMarco, 2012). Market efficiency considers the areas of transaction costs and price efficiency and will be 
measured using specific metrics of realized spreads, price efficiency and liquidity measures.   
Market integrity is measured by looking at the incidence of market manipulation of closing prices. 
Potential incidents are identified by using methods developed by the surveillance industry.  These events 
are then evaluated against the stock exchange announcements over the same period to determine if there 
is evidence of market manipulation.     
1.7 Chapter Outline 
The thesis is structured into five chapters shown here. 
Chapter 1:  Introduction. This section provides a short introduction, along with key background 
information and the objectives of the study.  
Chapter 2: Literature review. This focuses on current and historical literature around market 
microstructure, with a focus on the topics of transaction costs and algorithmic trading. 
Chapter 3: Data and methodology. This chapter will discuss the methods and data used to conduct the 
study.  
15 
 
Chapter 4: Results. This chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis, highlighting key facets. 
Chapter 5: Discussion and conclusion. The final chapter uses the empirical results to draw out a set of 
responses to the research questions above.  It will finish with suggestions for future studies. 
Chapter Summary 
The ‘Walrasian Auctioneer’ view of setting prices and quantity has been superseded in financial markets 
with the study of market microstructure.  Market microstructure focuses on a diverse range of topics, 
with the goal of understanding the process by which prices are formed within markets. Key areas of 
research in the field include price formation and discovery, transparency, market design and linkages to 
other areas of finance.   Market microstructure recognises that a number of potential frictions exist that 
can cause realised market prices to differ from the equilibrium prices that would otherwise hold. One such 
potential friction is the existence of fees charged by stock exchanges onto brokers to trade. Exchange fees 
may affect market quality, as well as investors’ net asset returns through implicit transaction costs. In 
South Africa, the equity market has a single transaction venue, namely the JSE.  On the 30th of September 
2013, the JSE changed its billing model by removing the minimum charge of R4.00 per transaction, as well 
as marginally dropping the percentage value charged per trade.   
This study investigates the change in the JSE billing model to determine if it caused a change in overall 
market quality. It is hoped that this will contribute towards the literature on optimal market design.  The 
study is conducted in the form of a trend analysis with the data sourced primarily from the Bloomberg 
Professional service. Market quality will be measured by considering metrics of implicit cost, price 
efficiency and liquidity, as well as the incidence of market manipulation.    
The next chapter provides a more thorough review of the topic of market microstructure, tackling several 
major areas of research. Key areas of market design and price formation are looked at closely. Transaction 
costs are also covered in detail before finally turning to the literature that has developed following the 
recent and dramatic growth in computer-based trading.  
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the literature review related to the research topic. The chapter is organized in the 
following manner. Section 2.2 starts with a general discussion of market microstructure.  Section 2.3 
provides an overview of the topic of market structure, before section 2.4 examines the central themes in 
the areas of price discovery and price setting.  Section 2.5 looks at the issue of transaction costs in more 
detail, helping to draw the distinction between these costs and exchange fees.  Section 2.6 discusses the 
growing trend and implications of algorithmic trading systems and its offshoot, high-frequency trading.  
The chapter summary concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Market Microstructure 
Adam Smith’s ‘Invisible Hand’ has always occupied an important place in economic thinking.  Leon Walras 
took the concept of a natural force of self-interest bringing together buyers and sellers further, developing 
the idea of a ‘Walrasian auctioneer’.  A ‘Walrasian auctioneer’ is a hypothetical market maker who 
matches demand with supply in perfectly competitive markets to ensure they always clear at equilibrium 
prices and volumes. Such a ‘Walrasian’ view of how a financial market sets prices and volumes was 
common until the 1970’s, with the issue of market frictions ‘largely ignored’ (Stoll, 2000). Since then, there 
has been growing scrutiny of the simplifying assumption that the observed price in the market is 
equivalent to a Walrasian equilibrium price (Beja & Goldman, 1980). The increasing complexity of financial 
markets has also helped grow academic interest and literature around the processes by which prices are 
formed – a subject that has taken on the name of market microstructure (Madhavan, 2000).  
Market microstructure is concerned with looking inside the ‘black box’ of price formation, considering 
aspects such as the design, structure and rules of financial markets and how they influence observed 
market prices.  The issue of transaction costs is addressed within this broader area, with market frictions 
resulting in prices that may diverge away from their expected behaviour (Easley & O’Hara, 2003). A key 
belief in the study of market microstructure is that the features of a market are relevant to the behavior 
of asset prices. For example, it has been shown that historic volume has predictive power over the pace 
at which price momentum reverses (Lee & Swaminathan, 2000). A long-run empirical analysis of 
transaction costs over the 20th century found that measures of market liquidity predicted stock returns 
one year ahead (Jones, 2002). Further, the study of microstructure can help in providing important policy 
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suggestions for the optimal design and level of regulation in financial markets. It also has implications for 
many other areas of finance including corporate finance and international finance.   
The study of market microstructure contains a wide and varied range of topics. Madhavan (2000) suggests 
grouping the existing academic research into four separate topics.  These are namely: price formation and 
price discovery; market structure and design; information and disclosure, and informational issues around 
the interface of market microstructure to other areas of finance. The topic of price formation and price 
discovery considers both static matters like transaction costs, as well as more time dependant issues such 
as how prices change to incorporate new and private information over time. The area of market structure 
and design focuses on trading protocols and rules, and how these can change and affect the process by 
which prices are determined. Information and disclosure looks at market transparency and how changes 
in the level of information provided to market participants can influence trading behaviour. Finally, 
informational issues arising from the interface of market microstructure speaks to how market 
microstructure relates to and enriches the debate in other areas of finance. An alternative approach used 
to review the field of market microstructure involves evaluating the theoretical models that seek to find 
equilibrium outcomes within a simple framework; and then making use of these theoretical underpinnings 
to understand the existing empirical analysis of markets (Biais et al, 2005). 
In this review, market structure and design is considered first to help ‘set the scene’. This is followed by a 
discussion around the main themes of price discovery and price formation.  A particular focus is then paid 
to two specific areas of potential relevance to this study.  The first is the topic of transaction costs, and its 
linkages to other areas of study in finance.  This is followed by a discussion on algorithmic trading systems, 
including high-frequency trading (HFT), which has been the topic of much of the recent literature.  HFT is 
of particular interest, as it has been called a paradigm shift in financial markets, with the potential to affect 
the workings of even the most fundamental aspects of the market (O’Hara, 2014). Matters around 
information and disclosure, along with links to other areas of finance, are touched on within the discussion 
below. 
2.3 Market Structure 
Market structure is concerned with a number of factors including: who can access the market; what 
instruments can be traded on a market; what levels of disclosure are required from different market  
participants, and what are the methods and rules relating to the routing of orders and setting of execution 
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prices (de Jong & Rindi, 2009).  There are a number of important areas to consider when designing and 
considering market structure.  This includes the market type which determines the allowable timing of 
trades; the need or presence of market makers, and the level of automation. Consideration needs to be 
given as to whether a market provides a price discovery function or if it makes use of prices that are set 
elsewhere.  The specific rules governing trading on the market also deserves attention.  These rules cover 
diverse aspects such as the allowable types of orders, tick size and minimum order sizes (or lots). Finally, 
notice should be paid to the transparency, and feedback, provided back to market participants throughout 
the trading process (Madhaven, 2000).  
Choices around market structure are not immaterial.  For example, a study by Amihud et al (1997) found 
that a phased-in change in the market type of the Tel-Aviv Stock exchange caused a positive market-
adjusted additional return of ~5.5% in the 30 days after the change. In another study, reductions in tick 
size (the smallest increment by which a price can be changed in a trading system) was found to be 
associated with higher levels of market efficiency and lower bid-ask spreads (Chordia et al, 2008). 
2.3.1 Order- and Quote-driven markets 
One of the key ways to classify financial markets is to distinguish between order-driven and quote-driven 
markets (Madhavan, 1992).  A primary difference between the two is the existence of formal market-
makers in a quote-driven system. Market makers provide liquidity to other market participants, ensuring 
that there is always a buy (bid) and sell (ask) price at which other participants can transact.  Quote driven 
markets are common in fixed income and foreign exchange markets. Equity exchanges that operate quote 
driven markets often impose requirements on market makers.  These requirements may include the need 
to be present in the market at all times.  It is also common for an exchange to require market makers to 
be willing to transact in at least a certain minimum number of shares, as well as place a maximum on the 
difference (or the ‘spread’) between the bid and ask prices that they quote at any time.   
Order-driven markets do not have formal market makers, and are normally structured as auction markets. 
Auction markets can be call auctions or continuous auctions.  In a call auction, all orders are entered into 
the call session and transparency is high, with market participants able to view each other’s order during 
this period.  At the end of the period, a ruling price is set at which all transactions take place based on the 
orders submitted.  A continuous auction operates differently, with market participants able to send orders 
at any time during the auction period and these orders are immediately executed at the time of 
submission against any available countervailing orders. Continuous auction markets are typically 
19 
 
electronic, with all participants able to observe previous transactions before entering their orders into a 
central place, which is often called a central order book or limit order book.  The central order book 
provides a matching system. Continuous auction markets are commonly used in the trading of both 
derivatives and stocks globally (de Jong & Rindi, 2009).  By contrast, pure call auction markets are 
uncommon at best.  However, the literature does suggest there are some benefits to the use of call 
auctions, as they concentrate liquidity into a specific period.  A theoretical analysis by Vayanos (1999) 
showed that a trader could achieve higher gains from trade if they can credibly commit to trading in a 
single piece in a call auction instead of having to spread out their trade to reduce market impact. An 
analysis of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange found that transaction costs for small trades are lower in the call 
market, but large trades are cheaper to execute in the continuous market (Kehr, Krahnen & Theissen, 
2001).  Overall, the literature suggests that while there may be welfare gains from structuring markets as 
call auctions, continuous auctions do provide a useful complement (Bias et all, 2005). 
2.3.2 Crossing Networks 
Crossing networks (sometimes called ‘dark pools’ or ‘upstairs markets’) provide an alternative venue for 
institutional investors to execute large trades and have taken on a growing importance in equity markets. 
A study of the US market in the first three months of 2008 found that nearly 30% of all equity volume 
occurred away from traditional exchanges (O’Hara & Ye, 2011).  Crossing networks are typically set-up as 
privately operated trading venues and are classified as order-driven markets (de Jong & Rindi, 2009).  
Orders submitted to crossing networks are not visible to other market participants.  These orders are then 
matched off against orders from other institutional traders, based on the rules of the crossing network.  
The specific rules used by the matching process are not always clear, but the transaction price is typically 
derived from prices prevailing in the primary market for the stock.  As an example, the rules of ITG’s Posit 
crossing network for US orders is to run a call auction eight times a day, with the price at which orders are 
executed chosen randomly from the stock’s primary market in the seven minutes following the end of the 
call auction period. This potential lack of transparency in price setting by crossing networks is one of the 
reasons why the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently recommend a change in 
regulation to force all crossing networks to disclose their matching rules to the SEC (Michaels, 2014). 
Another issue with crossing networks is that they create potential regulatory issues, such as the incentive 
to manipulate prices on the primary market (de Jong & Rindi, 2009).  On the other side of the debate, it 
has been suggested that crossing networks may help reduce trading costs by helping to locate trading 
counterparties who do not possess private information (Madhavan, 2000).  However, the economic 
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benefit of these crossing networks may still be small for average-sized block trades (Madhavan & Cheng, 
1997). There is also disagreement around the contribution of crossing networks to the process of price 
discovery (Ibikunle, 2014).    
2.4 Price Discovery and Price Formation 
Market microstructure literature in the areas of price discovery and price formation investigates the 
process by which market participants are able to convert their levels of demand and supply for financial 
instruments into fully realized transactions.  It subsumes the topic of transaction costs, and also 
investigates matters such as the speed and nature in which prices absorb and reflect new private and 
public information.  A general coverage of the key themes in the area is undertaken here, before moving 
onto a more detailed analysis of transaction costs in the next section.  
Early literature and models focused on the spread between the two-way (bid and ask) prices quoted by 
market makers.  This followed on from the pioneering work of Demsetz (1968), who argued that such a 
spread was the market makers compensation for ‘predictive immediacy’ in execution.  Empirical work has 
found evidence relating this spread to other market variables such as volume, risk and the number of 
market makers (Stoll, 1989). More recently, Barclay, Kandel and Marx (1998) found a significant negative 
relationship between changes in the spread and trading volumes.   
Theoretical models seeking to explain the variation in spreads initially focused on inventory management 
costs (Madhavan, 2000).  Inventory management costs relate to the costs borne by a liquidity provider in 
trying to maintain their inventory of stocks at an optimal level.  The term liquidity provider can be used in 
a more general sense than market maker, although the terms are used interchangeably here. Intuitively, 
the role of the liquidity provider is to actively buy and sell to provide immediacy, hopefully generating a 
small profit with each transaction. They do not wish to accumulate positions of any significant size.  For 
example, in the case where a liquidity provider buys a large number of shares from a seller, they are likely 
to end up with more shares than they wish to own.  The liquidity provider in this situation now runs a risk 
that the price of the share drops before they are able to reduce their inventory back to their optimal level 
– thus generating a realized loss. This underlying idea drives many of the models of price formation that 
are built around inventory management costs, such as that of Stoll (1978).  As the liquidity provider trades, 
their actual and desired levels of inventory diverge and they adjust their bid and ask prices accordingly.  
An interesting question that arises from this adjustment process is if the liquidity provider keeps the 
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spread constant and simply moves the mid (the average of the bid / ask) up or down, or if they widen or 
narrow the spread in reaction to sub-optimal inventory levels. Theoretical models provide a somewhat 
conflicting view with O’Hara and Oldfield (1986) showing that inventory levels influence the market 
makers in setting both the width and position of their quoted spreads.  An alternative approach by Ho and 
Stoll (1980) finds that the width of the spread does not change with inventory, but the position of the 
spread on the order book does move.  An empirical investigation of market makers on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE)’s SEAQ market finds that they almost never narrow the spread, but rather compete by 
moving their price around the market bid/ask levels (Reiss & Werner, 1996).  An important result that 
flows from these models is that liquidity providers provide an economically valuable service by bringing 
together different buyers and sellers through time, via the use of their inventory (Madhavan, 2000).  The 
economic value of this service is generally ignored in Walrasian markets, as it is assumed that all potential 
buyers and sellers arrive in the market at the exact same point in time. 
More recent models in market microstructure have increasingly incorporated informational aspects, 
looking at the interaction of liquidity providers with traders who may possess different levels of private 
and public information.  Such models also often incorporate rational expectations (Madhavan, 2000).  
These models typically distinguish between informed traders, noise traders and market makers.  The idea 
of an informed trader was first raised by ‘Bagehot’ (1971), where some traders have asymmetrically better 
information than the market makers and use this advantage to generate profits. Informed traders are not 
necessarily corporate insiders, although the term ‘insider’ is often used in the literature. However, they 
are held to have access to some level of material informational advantage when making trading decisions.  
For example, in Glosten and Milgrom (1985) the decisions of informed traders may be based on inside 
information, superior analysis or they may simply be trading for liquidity reasons. An empirical analysis of 
the electronic limit order book of the Australian Stock Exchange found that approximately 10% of orders 
were from informed sources. However, these orders potentially have a greater impact on prices than 
those of noise traders (Brown, Thomson & Walsh, 1999).  Noise traders (also often called liquidity traders) 
are market participants whose trading decisions are not based on market analysis or meaningful 
information (Jordan, Miller & Dolvin, 2012).  
In a seminal note, Kyle (1985) develops a model where a single informed trader with a monopoly on 
material information places orders over time. The informed trader attempts to maximize their profit 
before the information becomes public.  In this model, market makers only set a price after orders are 
placed and use the information on aggregate order flow to update their beliefs.  Kyle (1985) shows that, 
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in this framework, the market price will ultimately reflect all available information.  An important feature 
of noise traders is that their presence means uninformed traders cannot just look at transaction prices to 
uncover the information held by informed traders; as such prices also includes the actions of noise traders 
(Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). 
Market makers are generally held to be uninformed and tend to lose to informed traders on average, but 
are able to recoup these losses on noise traders (Madhavan, 2000). The risk of losing to informed traders 
requires some level of compensation to be made to the market maker. This implies that the bid-ask spread 
can be partly explained as including payment for the asymmetric information risks faced by the market 
maker. Models of asymmetric information can also be used to fully explain the empirical observation that 
larger trades (also called block trades) are typically done at a ‘worse’ price than small trades. This effect 
arises as market makers are uncertain if they are trading a block amount with a party that holds an 
informational edge or not (Easley & O’Hara, 1987). More recently, Duong and Kalev (2014) looked at the 
effect of removing the broker ID in the Australian Stock Exchange, which removes the ability for a trader 
to distinguish between informed and noise traders.  They found that anonymity allowed for improved 
liquidity, but at the expense of prices taking longer to adjust to the information contained in informed 
traders’ order flow.   
Finally, it should be noted that the assumption of noise traders in a market is not without its detractors. 
Some researchers have raised the question as to why noise traders are seemingly always willing to lose 
money to market makers and informed traders (Bias et al, 2005).  Introducing elements of bias from the 
field of behavioral finance may hold the answer to this question. In an analysis based on Kyle’s model 
discussed above, Benos (1998) finds that the actions of overconfident informed traders closely follows 
the behavior patterns of noise traders, although the model still requires some noise traders to be present.  
In this scenario, prices become more volatile but information is more quickly transmitted into prices. This 
finding is somewhat at odds with Odean (1998), who notes that the presence of overconfident traders 
can cause markets to limit their reaction to the information contained in the behavior of rational traders.  
He also finds that overconfidence in traders has been found to increase trading volumes.  
2.5  Transaction costs 
The topic of transaction costs fits within the broader area of price formation in market microstructure, 
with the literature normally exclusively focused on costs at the level of the investor.  Transaction costs are 
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important in financial markets as they may have considerable impact on asset prices and investment 
decisions. There are models linking higher transaction costs to both higher expected returns and lower 
trading volumes (Barclay et al, 1998). The higher expected return arises as investors will require increased 
compensation for investing in stocks with larger transaction costs.  And lower trading volumes come about 
as stocks with high transaction costs are likely to attract investors with longer holding periods who can 
effectively amortise such costs (a clientele effect).  While Barclay et al (1998) find evidence that costs have 
a greater impact on volumes than expected returns, Amihud and Mendleson (1986) provide support for 
the view that expected returns are a positive function of costs (as measured by bid-ask spreads).  They 
suggest that this may encourage firms to engage in liquidity-enhancing actions to bring down transaction 
costs in an effort to lower the cost of capital to the firm.  Vayanos (1998) suggests a general equilibrium 
model of transaction costs which shows that higher transaction costs can have two opposing effects on 
an investors demand for shares, causing them to buy fewer shares but also to hold on to existing shares 
for longer.   
More directly, high trading costs affect overall portfolio returns negatively and may lead to significant 
underperformance versus a benchmark.  Perold (1988) called this the ‘implementation shortfall’, although 
the term has subsequently taken on a separate specific meaning in the evaluation of trading performance.  
He compared a paper portfolio based on the Value Line ranking system with the real Value Line fund.  He 
found the paper portfolio was able to outperform the market by 20% a year from 1965 to 1986, but the 
real fund was only able to manage a 2.5% outperformance.  More recently, an analysis of trading costs 
across a number of markets and time found that transaction costs are economically significant when 
related to realised returns (Domowitz et al, 2001).  A link has also often been made between trading costs 
and price discovery.  By creating frictions in the market, trading costs can potentially slow down the 
process of price discovery.  In their investigation of the Hong Kong market, Choy and Zhang (2010) found 
strong support for the view that the market with lower trading costs will play a bigger role in price 
discovery.    
In attempting to measure transaction costs, Demsetz (1968) classic article has informed much of the 
subsequent literature.  He investigated transaction costs on the NYSE, dividing up the total cost into two 
distinct elements – brokerage fees and the bid/ask spread.   Subsequent work on transaction costs has 
expanded and refined on the original ideas set out by Demsetz (1968).  However, his proposed 
fundamental framework of viewing transaction costs in terms of explicit costs (normally brokerage fees) 
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and implicit costs (bid-ask spreads amongst other measures) remains very much intact.  We discuss each 
separately below. 
2.5.1 Explicit Costs 
Explicit costs are normally easily categorised and understood, but can vary greatly from equity market to 
equity market.  Explicit costs include: charges levied by brokers for trading services (brokerage charges / 
commission); additional market fees levied on the investor; clearing and settlement costs, and any taxes.  
The majority of these costs can be easily identified and measured. For example, within South Africa, any 
order to buy shares which results in a change of beneficial ownership will attract a Securities Transfer Tax 
of 0.25% of the value of the trade. Orders to sell shares are not subject to this tax.  Brokerage charges are 
trickier to measure as they are agreed in private contracts between the investor and broker and thus are 
not in the public domain.  Helping to overcome this limitation, a number of private firms collect 
information on financial market trades directly from institutional investors and provide estimates of 
explicit trading costs for various markets.  A commonly cited source for this data is Elkins McSherry (for 
example, see Pollin & Heintz, 2011 and Domowitz et al, 2001).  According to the company’s website in 
May 2014, they hold information on over 24 million transactions covering $7.2 Trillion worth of trading 
activity sourced from 1,500 investment manager and 2,000 brokers.  Given all this, it could be argued that 
the measurement of explicit transaction costs in equity markets at a point in time is largely an empirical 
matter.  But researchers still face a number of challenges including access to strictly controlled private 
data and appropriate analysis.  Over longer periods of time, these explicit costs are likely to change 
significantly as a result of changes to aspects like the tax regime and market regulations.  Jones (2002) 
provides an example of how NYSE commission rates were dramatically reduced following deregulation of 
minimum charges in 1975. However, such changes do not generally pass without notice and it would seem 
reasonable to assume explicit costs are likely to be stable over shorter periods of analysis.  
2.5.2 Implicit Costs 
Implicit costs are normally understood to be all the costs that are not explicitly included in the final price 
paid by the investor.   These costs depend on the price of the trade received by the investor relative to 
market conditions and are not insignificant. A study of 42 countries between 1996 and 1998 found that 
implicit costs represented roughly one-third of the total costs of trading (Domowitz et al, 2001).  The most 
important implicit cost is normally identified as the bid/ask spread (Pollin & Heintz, 2011).  The academic 
literature often breaks down the bid/ask spread into three separate components, namely:  order 
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processing costs; inventory management, and asymmetric information (de Jong et al, 1995).   Order 
processing costs relate to the costs borne by the liquidity provider of simply being present in the market 
and handling the transaction. These can include costs of maintaining systems for trading, exchange fees 
and settlement charges.  Inventory management costs and asymmetric information costs are derived from 
theoretical models of price formation.  These relate to the need to compensate the market maker (or 
other liquidity provider) for the risk of holding less than optimal levels of inventory, and for the risk that 
they may be trading with someone who possesses better information.   Various studies have been 
conducted on the size and nature of these three components of the bid-ask spread. For example, Glosten 
and Harris (1988) are not able to reject a hypothesis of a positive adverse-selection component in trade 
data.  Stoll (1989) finds that adverse information accounts for ~43% of the quoted spread on the 
NASDAQ/NMS stocks and order processing costs account for a further ~47%.  Inventory holding costs were 
found to account for just ~10%. Foster and Viswanathan (1993) found that the order processing costs 
showed little variation both intra- and inter-day.  But that asymmetric information costs varied through 
the day and tended to increase in periods of high trading volumes.   In a review of the literature on the 
topic, Biais et al (2005) found that transaction costs can cause both a temporary and a permanent impact 
on prices.  The temporary impact arises from the cost components of order processing and inventory 
management, while permanent changes are linked to asymmetric information. 
A possible objection to the use of bid/ask spreads is that the earlier theoretical models often assume the 
existence of a formal market-maker.  But the models can be easily extended to order-driven markets if 
we allow for brokers to take on the role of informal market makers, or to view the compensation for 
immediacy as also relating to potential opportunity costs incurred by more patient investors. Colliard and 
Foucault (2012) investigate this potential model of order-driven markets using the concept of maker 
(liquidity providers) and takers in limit order markets. They note that a maker obtains a better execution 
price but faces a non-execution risk.  Further, the trading venue can set different maker and taker fees to 
optimize revenue and trading. Madhavan (1992) modeled both a quote-driven and an order-driven 
market and found that the continuous trading periods were equivalent, as long as there was free entry 
into market-making. Finally, the move to electronic trading platforms (which are often order-driven) has 
also seen the rise of a new type of market maker, called an electronic market maker (EMMs) by Raman, 
Robe and Yadav (2012).  These EMM’s are typically traders operating in a proprietary fashion and seeking 
to profit from bid-ask spreads by providing liquidity.  Given all the above, it seems reasonable to assume 
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that the core idea underlying the use of bid/ask spreads is reasonable in both quote-driven and order-
driven markets.     
There are some further issues to using a simple bid-ask spread as a complete measure of implicit costs.   
As noted by Grossman and Miller (1988), the bid-ask spread is not a precise measure of the cost of trading 
immediately, especially when an order is large. In the case of large (typically institutional) orders, the 
volume of shares that a liquidity provider is willing to buy/sell may well be less than the volume that the 
investor wishes to transact.  Hence, a large seller is more likely to be concerned with how the bid will 
change over time than the current bid/ask spread.    Further, large trade sizes are often observed to be 
done at prices that are worse than smaller trades (Easley & O’Hara, 1987).  This implies that the real 
transaction costs faced by differing types of investors will not be the same as that implied by the bid-ask 
spread, and may vary with the size of the order. 
The point that costs may vary with trade size is especially important in the face of increased activity from 
institutional investors. The size of institutional investor trades can be very large relative to market 
volumes.  For example, Chan and Lakonishok (1995) found that more than half the value of institutional 
trades in the sample they studied took four or more days for execution.  This sample was based on data 
collected by SEI Corporation and covered the transactions of 37 large investment managers between the 
years 1986 to 1988.  An analysis of the stocks in the Nasdaq 100 over a 10 month period from May 2000 
found that approximately 86% of all trades over 10,000 shares originated from institutional investors 
(Griffin, Harris & Topaloglu, 2003). Keim and Madhavan (1995) reference the large growth and magnitude 
of institutional trading.  More recently, Chordia et al (2010) found that institutional trading has played a 
principal role in the recent volume increases in the US market.   
The focus on institutional investors has led to some recommendations that implicit trading costs could be 
better measured using alternative methods.  While general consensus may be hard to find, an 
‘implementation shortfall’ measure is suggested by both Bessembinder (2003) and Anand et al (2012).  
This method evaluates the average price received for an order against a reference price at the time of the 
trading decision.  The idea behind such a method is to try isolate and capture the overall market impact 
of the order. Supporting the case for measuring costs in this fashion is the evidence that most institutional 
orders are normally filled. Intuitively, this means that the market impact costs of trading should be 
significantly higher than any opportunity costs of not trading (Keim & Madhavan, 1995; Chan & 
Lakonishok, 1995).  Other options include benchmarking costs against the volume-weighted average price 
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(VWAP) or considering the mean of the open/high/low/close prices (Domowitz el al, 2001).  The principal 
problem with these approaches is that the private order flow data required for measurement is often 
unavailable for institutions, and impossible to access for retail investors. Irrespective, the presence and 
size of institutional investors and their orders in the market highlights the need to consider more than just 
the bid/ask spread when evaluating implicit costs. 
One other matter that should be considered is the stability of the bid-ask spread. While a detailed study 
of Ericsson on the Stockholm Stock Exchange for 59 trading days found that bid-ask spreads are 
remarkably stable (Hollifield, Miller & Sandas, 2004), there are a number of exogenous factors that can 
affect the size of the spread over time. For example, as previously mentioned, a reduction in minimum 
tick size is likely to reduce the spread (Chordia at al, 2008).  Further, the growing number of trading venues 
and resulting fragmentation of liquidity has also been found to reduce effective spreads (O’Hara & Ye, 
2011). 
2.6 Algorithmic Trading 
The proliferation of computers and connected networks has been a transformative force in financial 
markets and has led to the growth of algorithmic trading and its offshoot called high-frequency trading 
(HFT). Adding further impetuous to this movement has been both the growing complexity of the financial 
system; and the numerous advances made in the quantitative modelling of these markets (Kirilenko & Lo, 
2013). Highlighting just how rapid this growth has been, algorithmic trading was thought to be responsible 
for as much as 73% of trading volumes in the US in 2009 – from a base of almost zero in the mid-1990s 
(Hendershott et al, 2011). HFT on its own is now estimated to be anywhere from 40% to 85% of daily 
volume in the US equity markets (Huh, 2014).  
At its simplest, algorithmic trading is the use of mathematical models, computers and connected networks 
to automate the process of buying and selling shares (Kirilenko & Lo, 2013). The use of such systems allows 
for increased efficiency, meaning a smaller number of individuals can manage a much larger volume of 
orders. This is often achieved through the use of ‘parent’ and ‘child’ orders. The parent order is the actual 
order received from the client, and will normally be many magnitudes of size too large to allow for 
immediate execution. The trader will select an overall strategy for execution, based on client 
requirements and other factors. Once this strategy is selected, the whole or part of the parent order is 
entered into an algorithmic trading system, with various parameters selected based on the chosen 
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execution strategy. This computer system then automatically submits ‘child’ orders to the exchange over 
time, based on a programmed logic designed to achieve a specific aim (for example; to be 20% of overall 
volume that trades, or to spread the trades evenly throughout a trading day). 
High-frequency trading takes the logic of algorithmic systems one step further. HFT systems are 
specialised algorithmic systems programmed to automatically seek out profitable trading opportunities. 
Their recent growth has been driven by the increased market fragmentation found in markets like the US 
and Europe. In some ways, they can be viewed as simply closing arbitrage gaps in the market, although 
other strategies are employed. What makes them unique is that these profit opportunities may only exist 
for the tiniest fraction of a second, and it requires extremely high-speed systems to be able to identify 
and then exploit these opportunities (hence the term ‘high-frequency’). As HFT systems are completely 
computer based, they are not limited to human perceptions of markets. This gives them a potential 
advantage over human traders as they can think in terms of cycles of the market (often related to volume 
of trading) rather than in terms of time. The benefit in such an approach is that these cycles have a return 
distribution that is far more normal in shape than the traditional leptokurtic shape of financial data series 
(O’Hara, 2014; Brooks, 2008). 
Algorithmic trading and HFT are certainly not without their detractors. Fingers have been pointed at both 
as the reason behind events such as the ‘Flash Crash’ in 2010.  This was when US markets experienced 
extraordinary volatility and spikes in trading volumes, as broad stock indices like the S&P500 initially 
collapsed before rebounding with astonishing speed. An empirical analysis of that period suggests that 
HFT did not initiate the crash, but contributed to the scale of events by demanding execution ahead of 
other market participants (Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi & Tuzun, 2014). Another event that garnered significant 
attention was when the US stock market was thrown into turmoil one morning in August 2012 after Knight 
Capital failed to test its algorithmic systems adequately. Knight’s systems bombarded US exchanges with 
incorrect orders that ultimately cost the firm ~$460 million in trading losses. Adding to the firms woes, it 
was later fined $12 million by securities regulators for the incident (Mamudi, 2013). What has made HFT 
such a specifically controversial topic is the contention that some stock exchanges have provided HFT 
players with an unfair advantage through better access to their systems and unique order types. Michael 
Lewis’s (2014) recent book centered around this idea that HFT firms get preferential treatment from 
certain stock exchanges relative to normal traders, and it led to an uproar in the US market after its 
publication (Sukumar, 2014).   
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Irrespective of the public view, there is little doubt that these algorithmic systems have become an integral 
part of a modern equity market. As a consequence; many of the limit and market orders that are entered 
and trade on a stock market are generated from decisions made by computers, rather than from human 
traders. This ‘rise of the machines’ and its associated controversies has not escaped the academic 
community, and studies into the effects of algorithmic trading and HFT have proliferated in recent years.  
Hendershott and Moulton (2011) looked at the introduction of the NYSE hybrid market in 2006, which 
allowed for a large increase in the speed and automation of trade. The change was found to raise effective 
bid-ask spreads by ~10% as a consequence of higher risks of asymmetric information. The increase in 
adverse selection did have the positive impact of increasing the efficiency with which prices incorporate 
new information. In a study of NYSE stocks from 2001 to 2005, algorithmic trading was found to improve 
liquidity for stocks with a high market capitalization, although no such significant effects could be 
identified for small-cap stocks. In contrast with the previous study, higher levels of algorithmic trading 
was found to actually lower adverse selection (Hendershott et al, 2011). A study of the Paris exchange 
and LSE found that average trade size, trade value and bid-ask spreads all fell by a significant amount after 
a six-fold increase in algorithmic trading. Importantly, the same study found that algorithmic trading made 
the market more informationally efficient by reducing the incidence of both closing price manipulation 
and the leaking of private information (Aitken et al, 2014). 
A number of recent studies have focused specifically on HFT. HFT firms employ various strategies in order 
to generate revenue. These strategies are normally jealously protected, as shown by events in 2009 when 
Goldman Sachs charged a former employee with theft after he allegedly took HFT code to a new employer 
(Glovin, Harper & Kisham, 2009). Despite the veil of secrecy that surrounds many of these firms, attempts 
have been made to characterize and document their behavior. One such approach is to divide them into 
those that use liquidity taking (aggressive) strategies and those that employ liquidity providing (passive) 
strategies (Baron et al, 2014; Huh, 2014). 
Liquidity taking strategies revolve around speed, using aggressive order types to trade in an instant before 
others in reaction to some potentially profitable event. By contrast, liquidity-provision strategies are 
developed around passive market-making activities, which seek to identify informed trading activities. 
They then use speed to cancel and modify their orders in an effort to capture some of the economic profits 
away from the trader with asymmetric information. In general, models built around the actions of 
aggressive HFT strategies tend to find that they increase the adverse selection and trading costs of others. 
In contrast, theories that model passive strategies find that they actually increase the efficiency of prices 
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and result in tighter bid-ask spreads (Baron et al, 2014). An analysis of public data on the NASDAQ during 
both a normal period, as well as a period of falling prices and heightened uncertainty, found that HFT 
enhanced market quality in both periods. This was measured through lower bid/ask spreads, greater 
depth of the order book and lower short-term price volatility. However, the possibility that HFT can 
increase the risk of a market failure during periods of severe market dislocation could not be discounted 
(Hasbrouck & Saar, 2013). Huh (2014) empirically studies the actions of liquidity-providing and liquidity-
taking strategies separately and then looks at their joint impact. She finds that aggressive HFTs can 
effectively act in the role of informed traders through access to hard information. Hard information is 
machine readable data that is relevant for prices, but generally considered public. However, in the short 
period in which HFTs can react to this hard information before others, it takes on the role of private 
information. This creates a scenario where aggressive HFT operate in the role of informed traders while 
passive HFTs represent market-makers, bringing the issue of asymmetric information back into the 
academic spotlight – albeit at a much faster pace. A final observation from Huh (2014) is that liquidity-
providing HFT typically provide less market making activities when markets are volatile, as the asymmetric 
information risks from aggressive HFTs increases. This would imply that in times of crisis, when liquidity is 
needed the most, the passive HFTs will withdraw from the market and potentially amplify the volatility. 
In investigating the success of aggressive against passive HFT strategies, Baron et al (2014) find that the 
HFT industry is a ‘winner-takes-all’ industry that is largely dominated by a small number of firms that 
typically follow a liquidity-taking approach and continue to seek improvements in speed in order to 
maintain their competitive edge.   
Chapter Summary 
Market microstructure is concerned with matters like the design, structure and rules of the financial 
markets and how they can affect price formation. Market microstructure is important as it plays a role in 
determining asset price returns and can provide guidance in the optimal design and regulation of financial 
markets. The study of market microstructure covers a wide range of topics including: market structure; 
price discovery and formation; price transparency, and linkages to other areas of finance.   
Market structure considers the design and rules of an exchange. A key distinction is drawn between quote-
driven and order-driven markets.  Order-driven markets do not have formal market makers and can make 
use of call auction or continuous auction markets. Equity exchanges are typically structured as continuous 
auction markets, but often complement this with call auction sessions at specific points in the day. 
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Crossing networks are also important trading venues, and can provide institutional investors with an 
anonymous way to try locate counterparties to trade large blocks.     
Price formation and price discovery has been an active field for research. Earlier models of price formation 
focused more on the impact of inventory levels on prices, with later models increasingly incorporating the 
concept of asymmetric information. The analysis of transaction costs focuses on the costs paid by the 
investor in turning latent demand or supply into a transaction. It considers both explicit and implicit costs.  
Explicit costs are easily understood and are directly measurable, assuming the data is available. Implicit 
costs are all the other costs that are not directly included in the final price paid by the investor.  Harking 
back to the pioneering work of Demetsz (1968), bid/ask spreads are normally used in the measurement 
of implicit costs.  However, this measure may not fully capture the implicit costs faced by institutional 
investors as their orders can be too big to allow for immediate execution.  
Algorithmic trading and HFT has been described as a paradigm shift for financial markets and consequently 
become a key talking point amongst both market professionals and the academic community. Studies of 
algorithmic trading have found slightly conflicting results about it effects on asymmetric information, but 
that it does generally improve price efficiency. HFT firms can be usefully divided into those that follow 
liquidity-taking strategies and those that pursue liquidity-providing strategies.  Studies of liquidity-taking 
strategies generally find that they tend to increase the trading costs of others, while liquidity-providing 
strategies can reduce trading costs. In times of severe market dislocation, it cannot be discounted that 
HFT firms will remove liquidity from the market at the moment when it is needed the most. The next 
chapter will provide more details on the data used in the study and the specific methodology that will be 
followed in obtaining results.    
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CHAPTER 3 DATA AND METHODOLGY 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the data and the methodology used in this study.  
Section 3.2 begins the discussion by providing details around the underlying data. Section 3.3 presents 
the research design. A chapter summary concludes the chapter.   
3.2 Data and Data Sources 
The daily and intra-day data used in this research covers all the stocks listed on both the Main board and 
the Alt-X board of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange on the 30th of September 2013. Warrants and 
investment products on the ZA04 segment of the JSE were not included for two reasons. Firstly, 
instruments in this segment trade very sporadically, and it is not unusual for there to be no trades for days 
or weeks at a time. Secondly, the investment characteristics and structure of these instruments can vary 
widely, making it impossible to draw any reasonable comparisons between different instruments. Daily 
and intraday data is obtained from Bloomberg Professional service. Daily data obtained includes the 
closing price, VWAP, high and low prices for the day as well as volumes and the number of trades 
concluded on each day. Intraday data includes the bid and ask prices in one minute increments for the 
week preceding the change, along with the same data over several subsequent one week periods.  In total, 
intraday data over the full 24 hours from the 23rd of September 2013 to the 31st of January 2014 is 
available, providing over 186,000 bid/ask observations per stock. This data has been cleaned to cover only 
the trading period running from 09:01 to 16:49 each day. The start and end times for each day were 
selected to remove call auction periods from the data.  This is done as the bid/ask spread inverts during 
these periods due to the manner in which the JSE reports data during call auction phases. One 
complication for comparability between small-cap stocks and the rest of the market is the presence of a 
midday call auction.  Stocks designated as segment ZA031 by the JSE, which represents stocks with a small 
                                                          
1 The JSE classifies each instrument listed on the exchange into specific segments. The segment in which a stock or 
other product is assigned is important in that the JSE trading rules primarily vary only by segment.  The major 
segments in the equity market are ZA01 (which is made up of all the members of the Top40 index and typically 
represents the largest stocks by market capitalization on the exchange).  The next segment is ZA02, which consists 
of all the members of the All-Share index that are not in the Top40 index. The All-Share index represents the top 164 
stocks on the JSE. Finally, the ZA03 segment represents all the stocks that do not fall within the All-Share index, 
including members of the Alt-X board, and are the smallest stocks on the exchange by market capitalization. 
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market capitalisation, have an additional call auction phase between 12:00 to 12:15 daily. The values of 
the bid/ask spreads for ZA03 stocks during this midday auction period is also removed from the data.    
In total, the sample consists of 404 companies listed on the JSE with daily data captured for the period 
running from the 1st of April 2013 to the 31st of March 2014. Out of this total number of stocks, 69 
companies were excluded from the analysis for various reasons including not having any pricing or trade 
information or price and trade information that is very sporadic (the stock may only trade a few times in 
each month).  Companies were also taken out of the analysis if there was a corporate action that resulted 
in no data being available after any point in the date range. In the case where corporate actions could 
affect the comparability of historical prices over the analysed period (such as stock splits), the historical 
data was backwardly adjusted using the appropriate adjustment factor from the Bloomberg Professional 
service to ensure data consistency. 
To help capture if there are potentially different changes in market quality and transaction costs amongst 
different classes of companies, the stocks are segmented in two separate ways.  The first is on the basis 
of closing price as of the date of the official change in exchange fees.  Prices are used because, intuitively, 
a R4.00 minimum charge per transaction is a greater friction to trade in a low-priced stock than in a high-
priced stock. A separate classification is also done by market capitalisation, based on the same date as the 
closing price segmentation.  In each case, the stocks are subdivided into equally sized quintiles.  This 
provides a greater level of granularity in market capitalisation groups than the ZA01, ZA02 and ZA03 
classification used by the JSE. The data used to subdivide the sample is also obtained from the Bloomberg 
Professional service.  
3.3 Research design 
The aim of this research is to establish the impact of the change in the JSE billing system that was 
implemented from the 30th of September 2013 on overall market quality.  This is evaluated within the 
framework suggest by Harris and DiMarco (2012), which considers how market design affects both market 
efficiency and market integrity. The student t-test is used to measure for any changes in market efficiency 
and integrity before and after the change in the billing system.  
Additional tests are performed to compare any potential identified changes in the JSE to another market 
with similar return and structural characteristics. The intention is to provide a control market to help 
isolate if any potential changes arose from the amendment in exchange fees, or if they may have resulted 
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from other exogenous factors. To determine the most appropriate market for comparison, weekly price 
returns of the JSE All-Share index are correlated against a range of indices from both developed and 
developing markets globally.  The market with the highest correlation co-efficient is used for comparison. 
A limitation of the comparisons is that only end-of-day data is available for other markets, so intraday 
bid/ask spreads cannot be compared.  
 3.3.1 Measuring Market Efficiency 
Market efficiency relates to the topics of transaction costs and price efficiency and represents the more 
traditional measures of market quality. Transaction costs are evaluated using bid/ask spreads as in Harris 
& DiMarco (2012). Bid/ask spreads (BID_ASK) are measured using realised spreads rather than effective 
spreads.  This is because the interval data used makes it impossible to accurately ascertain the ruling 
bid/ask prices at the exact time of a transaction. This is not expected to create a problem as realised 
spreads and effective spreads are highly correlated (Hasbrouck, 2005). Lower realised bid/ask spreads 
imply that investors pay less for immediacy at any given point in time and would indicate both lower 
implicit transaction costs as well as a higher level of market efficiency.   
BID_ASK values for each one minute increment in the trading day are initially calculated for the weekly 
period just prior to the change in exchange fees, which covers the dates from the 23rd to the 27th of 
September (Monday through to Friday).  These values are then compared to the week running from the 
30th of September to the 4th of October.  Further, other selected weekly periods were also examined in 
subsequent months, in an attempt to capture any potential delayed changes in BID_ASK arising from 
traders being slow to update the parameters of their algorithmic systems.  The first full weeks in 
November and December are used, as they represent the weeks that are effectively one month and two 
months after the change in exchange fees. Finally, the week running from the 20th to the 24th of January 
is also examined. The first weeks in January are not used, as South Africa has a number of public holidays 
from late December to the start of January. For this reason, trading in the early parts of January tends to 
be slow and not representative of normal activity levels (average daily value traded on the JSE over 2013 
was approx. R15.8bln but only averaged R10bln in the first full week of January 2014, according to 
Bloomberg data). In each period, t-tests are conducted on the overall average BID_ASK, as well as on each 
individual stock BID_ASK, with a null hypothesis (Ho) of no change in BID_ASK between periods. In the 
individual cases where the null is rejected, it is also determined if the BID_ASK value showed a reduction 
or increase in transaction costs faced by investors. 
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Liquidity measures the sensitivity of asset returns to order flow (Chan, Hong & Subrahmanyam, 2006). An 
improved level of liquidity makes it easier for investors to implement their transactions quickly with lower 
market impact. As access to order flow data is often restricted, measures of liquidity look at both bid/ask 
spreads and traded volumes. Spreads have already been discussed above. Liquidity measures using 
volume data face several issues. One issue specifically relating to the JSE data is the requirement for local 
investors to put all trades through the exchange, even when they are just moving an existing investment 
from one internal account to another internal account. These ‘booking’ trades are normally done after 
the close using the Late Trade rule. This rule allows the institutional investor to put through an 
unchallenged trade at either the close or the VWAP price on the day. These trades can be large enough at 
times to skew the final volume figures reported by the JSE, especially in small-cap stocks.  To ensure that 
the measures of liquidity are not adversely skewed by these trades, we use a volume figure that excludes 
trades that are reported to the exchange after the market close. An equivalent measure of volume is also 
used for the market selected for comparison purposes. A more general issue with simple volume data is 
that it may see swings due to numerous external events such as earnings announcement, new information 
entering the public domain (both on a stock and market level) and global portfolio flows. To help correct 
for these events, two specific measures of liquidity are considered. 
The first is the Amihud (2002) measure of liquidity (ILLIQUID), which divides the absolute percentage 
return over a period by the volume (or value) over the same period. This is actually a measure of illiquidity, 
and has been found to have the best correlation amongst several other daily measures to dynamic higher-
frequency measures of liquidity (Hasbrouck, 2005).  The calculation behind ILLIQUID does not readily lend 
itself to aggregation of individual data.  As a consequence, overall measures of ILLIQUID for each market 
are determined using the return and value traded numbers from the respective benchmark indices. 
Individual stock level data is examined by conducting t-tests at the 5% level of significance, with a Ho of 
no change in ILLIQUID pre- and post the change in billing methodology. If Ho is rejected, the direction of 
the change is identified to determine if it shows an improvement in liquidity post the change.     
The second measure of liquidity is the average daily trade size (TRADE_VALUE).  It has been negatively 
linked to daily volumes (Barclay et all, 1998) and has the benefit of not being influenced by the changes 
in general market activity that arise naturally from global events. It is also especially interesting to this 
study as the removal of a minimum exchange fee per trade should improve the economic efficiency of 
trading in smaller increments. TRADE_VALUE is calculated by taking the total volume on the day and 
dividing it by the total number of trades.  
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In order to allow for the comparison and aggregation of TRADE_VALUE, the resulting average volume for 
each stock is multiplied by its average VWAP over the measured period to convert it into a value figure. 
The average VWAP over the full period is used instead of the ruling VWAP on each day to avoid the results 
being affected by any potential large changes in the stock price over time. These values are determined 
both for each individual stock, as well as aggregated by segments and across the whole market. This 
aggregation effectively gives a higher weighting to the bigger stocks, as these larger stocks typically trade 
in bigger increments per trade. T-Tests are conducted on both the individual stocks and also on the 
aggregated numbers with the null hypothesis (Ho) of no change in TRADE_VALUE. Further, for the 
individual stocks that do show a statistically significant change, the proportion that show an improvement 
(decrease) in TRADE_VALUE is also calculated. For ease of reading the values, TRADE_VALUE for the JSE 
stocks is converted into South African Rands by multiplying by 100 (as the exchange prices are 
denominated in cents).   
The speed and path by which prices adjust to reflect new information is an important determinant of the 
overall level of market quality. However, measuring this process can be difficult as the timing of when 
private information moves into the public domain is often uncertain.  Further, we may not have any 
matched pairs over an event date that will allow us to draw any inferences. One method that is used to 
proxy the efficiency with which prices reflect new information is to look at the dispersion of individual 
daily stock returns (DISPERSE) against the index before and after the event (Amihud et al, 1997). This is 
calculated by working out the difference between the actual returns and estimated returns for each stock 
before and after the event.  Estimated returns are based on the standard market model. A Relative Return 
Dispersion index level for each day can then be computed by summing the squares of the individual stock 
excess returns on each day. DISPERSE index values for each market overall are calculated. Additionally, 
separate index levels are determined for each market capitalisation and stock price segment. A 10 day 
moving average of each index is then derived to provide a clearer picture of the trend. An overall average 
value for DISPERSE is calculated for each market and segment using the 120 days before and the 120 days 
after the change in exchange fees. To determine if there is any overall change in DISPERSE, the difference 
in the average values between the two markets pre- and post the change is evaluated using the student 
t-test with a null hypothesis of no change.   
Finally, high to low ranges are often used in studies to provide a sense of volatility (Bennet & Wei, 2006). 
The study considers high-low ranges relative to the overall day’s VWAP (HI_LOW).  This provides an 
additional metric to analyse the implicit transaction costs faced by institutional investors and is similar in 
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calculation to the effective bid/ask spread. The rationale of this measure is that it covers a longer period 
than a simple bid/ask spread, and hence is more closely aligned to the large order sizes of institutional 
investors.  Using VWAP provides the average transaction price that an investor could have expected to 
receive on the day, irrespective of whether they were buying or selling.  In this manner, it is similar to the 
transaction price in an effective spread, while the high and low can be thought of as being analogous to 
the quoted bid and ask prices.  Alternatively, the high and low can be viewed as the highest price that a 
buyer would have paid and the lowest price a seller would have received respectively.   
 3.3.2 Measuring Market Integrity 
The level of market integrity is an important element of overall market quality and focuses on the level of 
market manipulation, insider trading and potential broker-agent conflicts. The scope of this study will limit 
itself to market manipulation. This is partly because the change of exchange fees is unlikely to have any 
significant impact on the incidence or profitability of insider trading. And it is also partly as identifying 
incidents of insider trading is complex and fraught with difficulties as the individuals and firms involved in 
such practices are unsurprisingly secretive about their activities. Broker-agent conflicts cannot be 
measured as there is no access to private order flow to enable any reasonable evaluation of this potential 
issue.  
Market manipulation (MARKET_MANIP) involves deliberate action to move the price of a financial 
instrument away from its true level in order to make profit. It is often done on the closing price as this is 
an important level for many market participants.  For example, the value of funds and derivative contracts 
are normally marked to market at closing prices. The general approach used in Aitken et al (2014) is 
followed as far as possible in seeking incidences of market manipulation.  This approach is based on the 
experience of the surveillance industry which monitors for such events closely. Potential incidents of 
manipulation occur when the price return just before and in the closing auction deviates significantly from 
its average return and then mean reverts at least halfway in the early part of the next trading day.  
However, given limitations of the available intraday data on the JSE over the period, VWAP prices need to 
be substituted into the calculations as the exact prices just prior to the closing auction and just after the 
following day’s opening auction are not available.  On this basis, market manipulation is suspected if both 
of the following conditions hold.  Firstly, the closing price change against the days VWAP is more than 3 
standard deviations away from the average over the previous 30 days. The second condition is that the 
following days VWAP shows at least a 75% reversion back from the closing level. Where an incidence of 
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market manipulation is suspected, news stories over the period are screened to determine if there was 
potential information that could reasonably account for the move. Any incidents which may be explained 
by the release of price sensitive news (either released on the day in question or after market had closed 
on the prior day) are then subsequently excluded. In total, 100 days before and 100 days after the event 
where examined for each stock in each market investigated 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter discussed the data and methodology used in the study.  The data covers 404 stocks listed on 
the JSE, with 69 stocks excluded for various data reasons.  Stocks are segmented by both closing price and 
market capitalisation. The data is sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service and covers both 
intraday and daily public information.   
The general methodology employed is one of a trend analysis around the JSE billing model change on the 
30th of September 2013. Market quality is evaluated according to a framework which considers measures 
of market efficiency and measures of market integrity. Wherever possible, the results for the JSE will be 
compared to those of another exchange to provide a control variable. A limitation of this comparison is 
that only end-of-day data is available for comparison purposes. Market efficiency is evaluated using 
realised bid/ask spreads, the Amihud illiquidity ratio, average daily trade value, the dispersion of stock 
returns to market returns and a high-low to VWAP measure to capture daily ‘effective spreads’. Market 
integrity uses measures developed by market surveillance units to identify possible incidents of market 
manipulation. The next chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis using the methodology 
outlined in this chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the statistical analysis undertaken on various metrics of overall market 
quality.  The chapter starts with a discussion in section 4.2 on the choice of market that is selected for the 
purposes of comparison to the JSE data. Section 4.3 provides summary and descriptive data from the two 
markets on which the analysis is conducted.  This is followed by the analysis of various metrics of market 
efficiency in section 4.4.  Section 4.5 looks at the aspect of market integrity, presenting results relating to 
incidents of potential manipulation of closing prices. The chapter summary concludes the chapter.   
4.2 Selection of Market for Comparison 
To ensure that any measured changes in the metrics considered reflect the impact of the change in 
exchange fees, and not an event exogenous to this study, the results of the JSE are compared with another 
market. A total of 21 developed and emerging-market indices are considered, with the goal of identifying 
the most appropriate market to use to compare to the JSE. These indices are selected on the basis that 
they are broadly representative of overall market returns in their respective individual countries. The 
underlying countries in the analysis cover all major time-zone regions, and include South Africa’s major 
peers and trading partners.  
Following the selection of the indices, the local currency price returns of each index are correlated against 
the weekly local currency price returns of the FTSE/JSE All-Share index.  The correlation co-efficient is 
determined using the weekly data for the two-year period prior to the change in the JSE exchange fees.  
The All-Share index is selected for South Africa as it represents all ZA012 and ZA02 stocks, and is the 
broadest stock-exchange index on the JSE. The results of this analysis is shown in Table 4.1. The five indices 
with the highest level of correlation to the All-Share index come almost exclusively from the same time-
zone region as South Africa; namely EMEA (Europe, Middle East and Africa). On the basis of the analysis, 
the German stock exchange is selected as it has the highest correlation and t-test.       
 
                                                          
2 See footnote 1 in Chapter 3 for more details on the ZA segmentation used by the JSE. 
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Table 4.1: Correlation with FTSE/JSE ALSI Weekly Returns 
(Weekly, 2 Years) 
Index Country Region Correlation T-statistic 
DAX Germany EMEA 0.76 11.759 
FTSE-100 UK EMEA 0.744 11.195 
OMX-30 Sweden EMEA 0.724 10.545 
CAC France EMEA 0.7 9.892 
AEX Netherlands EMEA 0.69 9.574 
Hang-Seng Hong-Kong Asia-Pac 0.68 9.397 
SMI Switzerland EMEA 0.659 8.798 
Bovespa Brazil Americas 0.655 8.465 
Nasdaq 
Comp 
USA Americas 0.65 8.632 
BEL-20 Belgium EMEA 0.65 8.698 
ASX-200 Australia Asia-Pac 0.648 8.54 
S&P500 USA Americas 0.64 8.361 
KOSPI South Korea Asia-Pac 0.62 7.86 
FTSE-MIB Italy EMEA 0.606 7.65 
MICEX Russia EMEA 0.596 7.416 
Merval Argentina Americas 0.557 6.745 
Bolsa IPC Mexico Americas 0.538 6.406 
IBEX-35 Spain EMEA 0.525 6.193 
ISE-100 Turkey EMEA 0.491 5.667 
Nikkei-225 Japan Asia-Pac 0.375 4.071 
Shanghai 
Comp 
China Asia-Pac 0.325 3.382 
Data used sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service 
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
This section provides separate summary statistics for both the JSE and German Xetra exchanges. 
Similarities and differences between each market are highlighted in the final part of this section. 
4.3.1 Descriptive Analysis of JSE Stocks 
Details of the structure and trading rules of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange were discussed in chapter 
one, and a discussion of the key features of the data is provided in chapter three. Summary statistics of 
the data is shown in Table 4.2 below.  The daily volume and daily value traded figures are determined by 
averaging the values for each trading day from the 30th of June 2013 to the 30th of September 2013 (a 
three month average). 
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 Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for included JSE-listed stocks (as of 30th September 2013 ) 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
(in Millions of Rand) 
Closing Price 
(in  SA cents) 
3 Month Daily 
Volume 
(in shares) 
3 Month Daily Average 
Value Traded 
(in Rand) 
Mean 31,001.86 5,027.79 472,609.48 27,978,417.90 
Median 2,378.21 941.00 111,923.45 448,195.30 
Std Deviation 129,101.04 10,485.04 1,006,476.85 106,631,451.38 
Minimum 4.23 2.00 72.81 4.31 
Maximum 1,701,288.97 92,844.00 7,752,657.75 960,997,455.16 
Data used sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service 
 
Table 4.2 shows that there is a wide spread between the lowest and highest values in each case. Further, 
the median value is well below the mean value for both market capitalisation and closing price. This 
suggests a long tail of stocks with low prices and also a long tail of stocks with a low market capitalisation. 
The same trend is also evident in the volume data, suggesting that the data set includes a large number 
of low price/ low market cap stocks with low levels of trade.  
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 presents the cumulative total number of stocks against market capitalisation and share 
price respectively.  Figure 4.1 shows that the vast majority of stocks included in the study have a low 
relative market cap compared to the largest stocks covered. Out of the 335 stocks included, 283 stocks 
have a market cap of less that R35 billion and 317 have a market cap below R103 billion. The largest 
company, BHP Billiton, had a market capitalisation of approximately R1,701 billion on the date in question.  
The distribution of prices shown in figure 4.2 is slightly wider than that displayed by market capitalisation.  
However, nearly 60% of the stocks (199 of 335) have a price under R18.55 and nearly 90% (301 of 335) 
have a price under R130 / share.    
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4.3.2 Descriptive Analysis of the German Xetra market 
Following the selection of the German market for comparison purposes, the study obtained data on the 
stocks listed on the Xetra trading system. The limitation of only taking data from the Xetra market was 
deliberate. While the German financial landscape consists of a number of different exchanges, the 
majority of these are regional in nature and/or are simply alternative trading venues. Further, the 
selection of Germany was based on the high correlation of the FTSE/JSE All-Share with the DAX index. And 
the DAX index considers only prices and stocks from the electronic Xetra market. A useful feature of the 
Xetra market is the existence of the regulated market and the open market (also called the regulated 
unofficial market). The difference between the two relates to the entry standards for listing, with the 
stocks in the regulated market needing to meet a higher standard.  In this way, it is analogous to the JSE’s 
structure of a Main board and the Alt-X board. In total, data on 611 stocks from the Xetra exchange was 
originally downloaded.  However, as with the JSE data, this number was reduced by excluding any stocks 
with insufficient pricing data.  This resulted in a final sample of 490 stocks being analysed.  
Table 4.3 provides the summary statistics of the included German Xetra stocks. This table is retained in 
the original currency denomination of Euros. Again, there is a wide spread between the minimum and 
maximum values in each case.  Further, for each metric, the median value is once again much lower than 
the average - again implying a long tail of illiquid, smaller-cap stocks in the sample.  
  Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for included German Xetra-listed stocks (as of 30th 
September 2013) 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
(in Millions of Euro) 
Closing 
Price 
(in  Euro) 
3 Month Daily 
Volume 
(in shares) 
3 Month Daily Average 
Value Traded 
(in Euro) 
Mean 2,657.65 23.85 272,087.89 6,835,896.16 
Median 97.39 9.00 10,732.73 67,533.44 
Std Deviation 9,636.14 46.79 1,182,911.34 26,275,383.50 
Minimum 1.07 0.01 78.41 436.24 
Maximum 79,169.95 606.35 13,968,072.64 196,083,587.27 
Data used sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service 
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Figure 4.3 and figure 4.4 provide the same cumulative plot of the number of stocks against market 
capitalisation and closing price that was shown for the JSE stocks. While the distributions look generally 
similar, it is worth noting that the market capitalisation picture does show evidence of a slightly more 
even distribution than the JSE.  
 
4.3.3 Comparison of JSE and Xetra Summary Statistics 
The data for the German Xetra stocks was converted into South African terms by using the prevailing EUR-
ZAR exchange rate as of the 30th September 2013. The statistical measures of the two exchanges were 
then compared to each other and the results are shown in Table 4.4. Any value above 1 in Table 4.4 
indicates that the Xetra value is greater than the JSE value for that measure.   
Table 4.4 shows that the average market capitalisation of JSE stocks is smaller than Xetra. However, the 
median and maximum values are much larger for the JSE. The maximum value is driven by the extremely 
high market capitalisation of BHP Billiton, the world’s biggest miner, on the JSE.  On a price level, the Xetra 
stocks carry much higher prices than the JSE across the board – and the knock-on effect of this is seen in 
the volume data with median and average volumes proving much lower on the Xetra.  This can be 
expected, given the higher prices. More interestingly, the value traded statistics show greater levels of 
trade on the Xetra.  Overall, the picture emerges that the Xetra has a slightly more even distribution of 
stocks by market capitalisation.  These stocks are typically much higher priced, and while they do 
subsequently trade in correspondingly smaller volumes, the overall value traded is still far greater on the 
Xetra than on the JSE.  
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Table 4.4: Comparison of JSE and Xetra stocks included in the study 
  Market 
Capitalisation 
(German Xetra in 
ZAR / JSE) 
Closing Price 
 
(German Xetra in 
ZAR / JSE) 
3 Month Daily 
Volume 
(German Xetra / JSE) 
3 Month Daily Average 
Value Traded 
(German Xetra in ZAR / JSE) 
Mean 1.17 6.45 0.58 3.32 
Median 0.56 13.00 0.10 2.05 
Std Deviation 1.01 6.07 1.18 3.35 
Minimum 3.44 9.52 1.08 1376.48 
Maximum 0.63 8.88 1.80 2.77 
Data used sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service 
 
4.4 Results of Market Efficiency Measures 
This section evaluates a number of measures of market efficiency to capture any changes in the overall 
level of market efficiency on the JSE post the change in the exchange fees billing model. The discussion 
begins by examining realised spreads (BID_ASK), before turning to Amihud’s Measure of Liquidity 
(ILLIQUID). Results for the average value of each trade (TRADE_VALUE) are then presented in their own 
sub-section. The Relative Return Dispersion (DISPERSE) index is considered next, before the section 
concludes by looking at the daily high-low range (HI_LO) 
4.4.1 Realised Spreads (BID_ASK) 
Realised spreads were measured using the closing values for the bid and ask in one minute increments for 
each stock in the study from the JSE, over the weekly periods outlined in chapter 3. As intraday data for 
the dates in question was not available for the Xetra market, only the JSE stocks were investigated for 
changes in BID_ASK.   
Table 4.5 shows the results of the analysis across the total market, considering all 335 stocks before 
looking separately at the 303 included stocks on the main board and the 32 included stocks listed on the 
Alt-X board. 
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Table 4.5: BID_ASK for JSE stocks – Summary  
Period Mean Median Std 
Deviation 
T-
statistic 
P-Value % Individual 
Reject Ho 
% 
Individual 
Lower 
Panel 1: All Stocks on the JSE BID_ASK 
23rd - 27th Sept 777.19 774.00 12.43     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 839.45 852.85 13.87 Yes** 0.00000 88.36% 53.72% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 731.97 754.55 11.59 Yes** 0.00000 91.64% 53.75% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 704.01 732.61 12.02 Yes** 0.00000 92.24% 45.31% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 769.31 793.87 13.22 Yes* 0.04657 94.03% 49.21% 
Panel 2: Main Board of the JSE BID_ASK      
23rd - 27th Sept 644.76 622.19 10.90     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 691.44 704.12 11.34 Yes** 0.00000 87.79% 54.14% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 594.38 617.62 9.49 Yes** 0.00000 90.76% 53.82% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 612.86 635.92 10.33 Yes** 0.00000 91.75% 42.81% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 639.96 659.63 10.63 No 0.15044 93.73% 48.24% 
Panel 3: Alt-X Board of the JSE BID_ASK      
23rd - 27th Sept 2109.43 2140.14 14.37     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 2303.70 2291.37 19.63 Yes** 0.00000 93.75% 50.00% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 2090.16 2091.61 12.06 Yes** 0.00001 100.00% 53.13% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 1642.13 1625.50 9.61 Yes** 0.00000 96.88% 67.74% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 2049.47 2052.79 18.96 Yes** 0.00000 96.88% 58.06% 
Data used sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service.  Yes* indicates significance at the 5% level and Yes** indicates significance at 
the 1% or better level.  
Table 4.5 above shows that there is strong statistical significance of change in spreads between most 
periods (at the 1% level or better). However, the overall direction of the change is inconsistent, with 
average spreads across the full market increasing between the week before (23rd to 27th Sept) and the 
week directly after (30th Sept to 4th Oct) the change in exchange billing. Spreads are then typically lower 
in the following two subsequent week-long periods before returning back towards levels seen in the 
period prior to the change in fees. On an individual stock level, a large portion of stocks showed 
significantly different BID_ASK levels across each week.  However, the direction of the change was 
generally mixed.  
The overall picture drawn is one of unstable BID_ASK values over the measured periods, implying that 
realised spreads are being driven by multiple factors beyond exchange fees. The value in incorporating 
additional periods is shown, as simply comparing the pre- and post-change weeks could have led to the 
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simple inference that spreads increased and market efficiency worsened. One other feature of the data is 
that simple average spreads on the JSE are very high, typically over 600bp on the main board.  
Table 4.6 shows the analysis in market cap quintiles with an equal number of stocks per band (67). The 
bands are sorted from largest market-capitalisation on the top to smallest on the bottom.  
Table 4.6: BID_ASK for JSE stocks – By Market Cap 
Period Mean Median Std 
Deviation 
T-
statistic 
P-Value % Individual 
Reject Ho 
% Individual 
Lower 
Panel 1: Stocks with Market Capitalisations from 20,052 mln to 1,707,220 mln 
23rd - 27th Sept 92.81 73.25 4.77     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 72.75 61.41 3.26 Yes** 0.00000 80.60% 57.41% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 52.87 51.49 1.26 Yes** 0.00000 86.57% 48.28% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 87.96 92.56 2.42 Yes** 0.00006 83.58% 28.57% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 61.57 58.78 1.46 Yes** 0.00000 88.06% 32.20% 
Panel 2: Stocks with Market Capitalisations from 4,304 mln to 20,051 mln 
23rd - 27th Sept 108.25 110.61 2.05     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 117.84 115.99 2.53 Yes** 0.00000 83.58% 48.21% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 94.12 92.31 2.79 Yes** 0.00000 86.57% 36.21% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 105.97 101.40 2.37 Yes** 0.00083 88.06% 23.73% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 128.10 119.68 3.91 Yes** 0.00000 91.04% 29.51% 
Panel 3: Stocks with Market Capitalisations from 1,162 mln to 4,303 mln 
23rd - 27th Sept 462.22 475.40 7.89     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 594.74 611.24 16.71 Yes** 0.00000 92.54% 59.68% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 544.75 530.21 9.46 Yes** 0.00000 92.54% 59.68% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 454.70 467.84 9.75 Yes** 0.00556 94.03% 52.38% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 526.19 474.06 14.58 Yes** 0.00000 97.01% 64.62% 
Panel 4: Stocks with Market Capitalisations from 197 mln to 1,161 mln 
23rd - 27th Sept 1224.58 1161.02 28.98     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 1335.89 1325.86 25.81 Yes** 0.00000 91.04% 49.18% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 1323.42 1334.37 24.85 Yes** 0.00000 95.52% 56.25% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 1041.23 1019.89 8.10 Yes** 0.00000 98.51% 53.03% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 1245.66 1212.82 27.32 Yes* 0.01595 95.52% 51.56% 
Panel 5: Stocks with Market Capitalisations from 5 mln to 196 mln 
23rd - 27th Sept 2072.92 2071.87 38.64     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 2145.62 2189.93 41.46 Yes** 0.00000 94.03% 53.97% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 1704.89 1741.99 30.66 Yes** 0.00000 97.01% 66.15% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 1876.05 1933.27 31.53 Yes** 0.00000 97.01% 64.62% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 1937.90 1955.66 35.03 Yes** 0.00000 98.51% 65.15% 
Data sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service.  Yes* indicates significance at the 5% level and Yes** indicates significance at the 1% 
or better level. 
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Table 4.6 shows that spreads increase as we go from the stocks with the largest market capitalisation 
through to the smallest stocks.  Further, the results for the 1st quintile in panel 1 are very interesting. 
While this is numerically only 67 out of 335 stocks, it represents ~99% of total combined market 
capitalisation on the JSE and ~91% of total average value traded. Thus, this quintile represents the largest 
and most liquid portion of the JSE.  And in this case, the mean BID_ASK is lower in all cases when compared 
with the pre-change week, and the difference is statistically significant in all periods.  Further, the standard 
deviation of BID_ASK is also lower, potentially indicating that BID_ASK is more stable. This implies that 
transaction costs faced by investors in this critical segment of the JSE were lower following the change in 
exchange fees. 
It can be seen that the increases in overall average spreads shown in Table 4.5 are in fact driven mainly 
by the stocks with a market cap under R4.3Bln (the third to fifth quintiles).  Intuitively, the difference in 
results found between the first and subsequent quintiles could arise as the stocks in the first quintile are 
the most actively traded by a long margin.  As such, use of algorithmic trading systems is likely to be much 
more evident in these stocks, and improvements in market efficiency may well be driven by adaptations 
in the logic of such systems. 
Finally, Table 4.7 shows the bid-ask spread broken down into stock price quintiles, again with 67 stocks in 
each segment. 
Table 4.7: BID_ASK for JSE stocks – By Stock Price 
Period Mean Median Std 
Deviation 
T-
statistic 
P-Value % Individual 
Reject Ho 
% 
Individual 
Lower 
Panel 1: Stocks with Prices from 7151c to 93625c 
23rd - 27th Sept 32.06 34.54 0.91     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 34.68 35.78 0.90 Yes** 0.00000 76.12% 58.82% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 34.13 32.01 1.24 Yes** 0.00000 85.07% 42.11% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 42.63 44.29 1.58 Yes** 0.00000 83.58% 17.86% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 31.02 27.69 1.23 Yes** 0.00171 88.06% 23.73% 
Panel 2: Stocks with Prices from 1921c to 7150c 
23rd - 27th Sept 106.18 84.79 5.04     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 103.17 92.62 3.78 Yes* 0.03122 83.58% 51.79% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 73.28 67.97 2.10 Yes** 0.00000 88.06% 42.37% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 106.78 105.00 3.36 No 0.65981 89.55% 30.00% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 148.66 88.52 10.79 Yes** 0.00000 91.04% 42.62% 
Panel 3: Stocks with Prices from 573c to 1920c 
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23rd - 27th Sept 350.66 295.10 11.29     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 266.21 263.35 4.33 Yes** 0.00000 91.04% 54.10% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 301.83 280.40 7.41 Yes** 0.00000 92.54% 64.52% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 305.31 307.21 5.20 Yes** 0.00000 89.55% 48.33% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 278.75 263.95 7.00 Yes** 0.00000 94.03% 57.14% 
Panel 4: Stocks with Prices from 124c to 572c 
23rd - 27th Sept 850.90 816.15 19.76     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 895.24 935.80 18.94 Yes** 0.00000 98.51% 59.09% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 792.59 796.34 13.79 Yes** 0.00000 95.52% 64.06% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 583.78 584.77 10.89 Yes** 0.00000 100.00% 61.19% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 701.82 700.20 12.31 Yes** 0.00000 100.00% 58.21% 
Panel 5: Stocks with Prices from 1c to 123c 
23rd - 27th Sept 2894.01 2635.32 137.07     
30th Sept - 4th Oct 3246.04 2990.98 131.51 Yes** 0.00000 92.54% 45.16% 
4th Nov - 8th Nov 2713.25 2576.92 98.85 Yes** 0.00000 97.01% 53.85% 
2nd Dec - 6th Dec 2608.50 2585.45 12.12 Yes** 0.00000 98.51% 63.64% 
20th Jan - 24th Jan 2899.57 2672.01 101.92 No 0.88366 97.01% 61.54% 
Data sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service.  Yes* indicates significance at the 5% level and Yes** indicates significance at the 1% 
or better level. 
Table 4.7 again draws a picture of generally unstable BID_ASK values, which makes deriving any specific 
inferences around the effect of the change in exchange fees difficult to tease out. An interesting feature 
of the data is that BID_ASK values in the 2nd and 3rd price quintile actually fell overall between the pre- 
and post-change weeks.  This is against the overall increase in spreads seen in table 4.5.  Further, it is 
interesting to note how spreads clearly increase as price falls, echoing the trend seen in the market 
capitalisation quintiles. The average BID_ASK in the top quintile is between 30-40bp, while spreads in the 
bottom quintile vary between 2600bp to 3250bp. To a certain extent, some of these higher bp spreads 
are a mathematical effect as the lowest price increment on the JSE is 1c3. Yet the trend of higher spreads 
in lower-priced stocks is still clear across the quintiles. 
4.4.2 Amihud Measure of Liquidity (ILLIQUID) 
The results for ILLIQUID are evaluated in this section, beginning with an examination of the overall market 
in each country. The results derived using the data from the FTSE-JSE All-Share and Xetra DAX Indices are 
                                                          
3 If a stock has a bid price of 10c and a ask price of 11c, then the spread is as low as possible given the minimum tick 
size, yet it is still 10% or 1000bp. By contrast, a 1c spread on a share with a bid / ask price of 10000 to 10001 is only 
1bp.  
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shown in Figure 4.5.  The key date when the change in billing methodology became effective is shown by 
the diamond shape on the graph. Both series show a similar overall trend, and what is immediately 
noticeable for both markets is the large spikes experienced over the end of 2013.  This is typically a period 
of low volumes in both markets.  In South Africa, both the 24th and the 31st of December are only half-
days (with the market hours running from 9:00 – 12:00, rather than the normal 9:00 – 17:00). In Germany, 
there were five non-trading days during the period from the 24th of December to the 1st of January 
(excluding any weekends). To reduce the impact of this on our analysis, these outlier points are removed 
from the individual stock measures of ILLIQUID. Comparing the two markets, there seems to be little 
evidence from the chart that the change in billing methodology had any real significant change on 
ILLIQUID across the overall market, beyond changes which may be the result of other external events. 
 
The summary results of ILLIQUID on each individual stock are shown in Table 4.8. The table shows the 
percentage of stocks in each category in which the null hypothesis that ILLIQUID was unchanged was 
rejected at the 5% level of significance. The percentage of stocks that showed an improvement in ILLIQUID 
in the cases where the null is rejected is also shown.  
The results from the JSE show no significant evidence that the change in exchange billing had any strong 
impact on ILLIQUID.  A relatively small percentage of stocks showed a statistically significant change in the 
metric, and there was no specific trend in the direction of the change.  If anything, there does appear to 
be slightly more evidence of a change in the metric within the large market capitalisation and higher priced 
stocks. But the direction of the change remains ambivalent. 
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Table 4.8: Individual ILLIQUID for JSE and Xetra Stocks 
Panel 1: JSE 
 Total Main Board Alt-X   
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 11.94% 12.54% 6.25%   
Of which Improvement 57.50% 57.89% 50.00%   
Market Cap (mln ZAR): 1 707 220-20 052 20 051-4 304 4 303-1 162 1 161-197 196-5 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 28.36% 14.93% 11.94% 2.99% 1.49% 
Of which Improvement 68.42% 50.00% 37.50% 100.00% 0.00% 
Stock Price (ZAR cents): 93 625-7 151  7 150-1 921 1 920-573 572-124 123-1 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 22.39% 20.90% 7.46% 4.48% 4.48% 
Of which Improvement 40.00% 71.43% 60.00% 66.67% 66.67% 
Panel 2: Xetra 
 Total Regulated Open   
Reject Ho as Percent 24.49% 28.15% 12.82%   
Improvement as Percent 91.67% 90.48% 100%   
Market Cap (mln EUR): 1103600-18001 18000-2521 2520-797 796-284 283-10 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 29.59% 42.86% 17.35% 17.35% 15.31% 
Of which Improvement 79.31% 95.24% 94.12% 100.00% 93.33% 
Stock Price (EUR): 606.35-33.01 33.00-14.26 14.25-5.09 5.08-2.176 2.175-0.01 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 25.51% 29.59% 23.47% 23.47% 20.41% 
Of which Improvement 92.00% 86.21% 86.96% 100.00% 95.00% 
Data sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service.   
The data for the German market corroborates the view that the change in JSE exchange fees did not 
impact the ILLIQUID ratio. The numbers show that a higher portion of individual stocks on the Xetra 
actually experienced a statistically significant change in ILLIQUID over the same period.  Further, the 
direction of the change in these cases shows a clear bias towards improvements in liquidity.  Overall, on 
the basis of ILLIQUID, there is little reason to believe that the JSE saw any improvement in individual stock 
liquidity as a consequence of the change in exchange fees. 
4.4.3 Average value of individual trades (TRADE_VALUE) 
The removal of the floor in exchange fees should reduce the economic cost associated with trading in 
smaller increments. TRADE_VALUE measures if there has been any reduction in the average value of each 
individual trade done on the exchange subsequent to the change in exchange fees. The results for the JSE 
are shown first in Table 4.9, with the results from the Xetra exchange in Table 4.10.  
The results for TRADE_VALUE on the JSE in Table 4.9 appear consistent with the results for ILLIQUID.  
Overall, there is no statistically significant change in aggregate values.  On an individual level, there 
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appears to be a greater level of deviation in TRADE_VALUE amongst larger stock in terms of both stock 
price and market capitalisation.  Yet the direction of the change does not show any specific trend.  
Table 4.9: TRADE_VALUE for JSE Stocks 
Overall Total Main Board Alt-X  
Mean (Pre / Post) 53,536.19 / 
51,787.86 
56,319.73 / 
54,821.77 
15,180.14 / 
13,067.70 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 10293.67 / 
13252.89 
10753.15 / 
14390.06 
23650.2 / 
20369.66 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) No No No 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 24.18% 25.08% 15.63% 
Of which Improvement 55.56% 52.63% 100.00% 
Market Cap (Mln ZAR) 1707220-
20052 
20051-4304 4303-1162 1161-197 196-5 
Mean (Pre / Post) 78,650.24 / 
79,119.24 
56,705.83 / 
54,801.64 
58,105.94 / 
53,047.99 
37,158.57 / 
37,067.96 
13,041.43 / 
13,534.64 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 9,537.16 / 
15,016.86 
12,012.87 / 
18,358.66 
29,380.68 / 
43,924.57 
36,203.79 / 
30,947.32 
10,119.80 / 
12,945.30 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) No No No No No 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 40% 37% 18% 10% 15% 
Of which Improvement 56% 56% 50% 57% 60% 
Stock Price (ZA Cents) 93625-
7151 
7150-1921 1920-573 572-124 123-1 
Mean (Pre / Post) 86,015.74 / 
83,006.04 
56,262.07 / 
55,143.43 
59,177.25 / 
56,127.92 
34,376.92 / 
36,724.00 
13,950.61 / 
13,065.88 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 14,021.33 / 
15,980.11 
13,228.67 / 
19,797.80 
38,657.14 / 
34,505.26 
17,766.12 / 
45,789.31 
7,101.01 / 
6,559.98 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) No No No No No 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 43% 31% 13% 15% 18% 
Of which Improvement 45% 57% 67% 80% 50% 
Data sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service.  Yes* indicates significance at the 5% level and Yes** indicates significance at the 1% 
or better level. 
Moving to the values for the Xetra exchange shown in Table 4.10. The actual values for TRADE_VALUE for 
the Xetra are smaller than the JSE in numerical terms but are typically between 1 to 2 times the sizes for 
the JSE if we adjust for the differences in exchange rate (results not shown).  Looking at the results of the 
aggregated t-tests show a distinct contrast to the JSE, with Ho rejected in a number of cases. Both the total 
data and the data from the regulated board show a statistically significant decline in TRADE_VALUE. The 
breakdown of the results by stock price may give us further clues as to what is driving these changes. All 
price segments, with the exception the highest priced stocks, show a statistically significant change on the 
aggregated level. However, there is no definitive directional pattern across the various price buckets. 
Further, the individual stock results highlight that the direction of any change in TRADE_VALUE is not clear. 
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The data seems to point to a non-statistically significant change in the highest priced stocks resulting in 
the finding of an overall reduction in TRADE_VALUE. Yet the statistically significant changes in the lower 
priced segments do not point to any specific, systemic reduction in TRADE_VALUE.  In total, the results 
for the JSE and Xetra on TRADE_VALUE do not appear to support the idea of any change in liquidity arising 
from the change in exchange fees.  
 Table 4.10: TRADE_VALUE for Xetra Stocks  
Overall Total Regulated Open  
 
 
 
 
Mean (Pre / Post) 5,639.55 / 
5,461.97 
6,505.09 / 
6,301.27 
2,652.78 / 
2,608.81 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 458.84 / 
552.74 
591.17 / 
706.31 
248.27 / 
248.07 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) Yes* Yes* No 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 45.10% 49.06% 32.48% 
Of which Improvement 47.06% 50.27% 31.58% 
Market Cap (mln EUR) 1103600-
18001 
18000-2521 2520-797 796-284 283-10 
Mean (Pre / Post) 12,050.28 / 
11,682.07 
5,872.19 / 
5,154.80 
4,643.98/ 
4,657.84 
2,937.98 / 
2,865.90 
2,026.07 / 
2,354.37 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 1,203.83 / 
1,539.50 
736.93 / 
591.39 
1,456.83 / 
1,637.83 
377.39 / 
380.83 
744.53 / 
887.50 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) No Yes** No No Yes** 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 61% 60% 44% 26% 35% 
Of which Improvement 58% 54% 42% 40% 26% 
Stock Price (EUR) 606.35-
33.01 
33.00-14.26 14.25-5.09 5.08-2.176 2.175-0.01 
Mean (Pre / Post) 12,270.42 / 
11,673.37 
6,589.85 / 
6,283.12 
4,468.69 / 
4,574.24 
2,749.25 / 
2,640.85 
1,656.70 / 
1,795.85 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 1,917.32 / 
2,235.16 
580.17 / 
570.67 
289.38 / 
381.85 
402.41 / 
241.07 
234.44 / 
175.33 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) No Yes** Yes* Yes* Yes** 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 51% 56% 44% 39% 36% 
Of which Improvement 56% 56% 44% 42% 29% 
Data sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service.  Yes* indicates significance at the 5% level and Yes** indicates significance at the 1% 
or better level. 
4.4.4 Relative Return Dispersion (DISPERSE) 
The values for the Relative Return Dispersion indices for each market and segment are plotted and 
displayed in Appendix B. In each chart, all values for the JSE are shown on the left-axis, with the values for 
the Xetra shown on the right-axis.  The overall average for the JSE for the pre- and post-period is shown 
as a dotted line on each chart. 
53 
 
While the overall DISPERSE average for all stocks on the JSE does not change dramatically, it does show a 
small reduction. By contrast, the overall average for the Xetra stocks actually increases (not shown on the 
charts). From the individual charts, it can be seen that the fall in average DISPERSE seems to be higher for 
the larger market capitalisation stocks on the JSE. The average DISPERSE for Xetra shows a slightly similar 
pattern (not shown on the charts), but the reduction in average DISPERSE is not as dramatic and also turns 
to an increase after the 1st and 2nd market cap segments. However, when testing more formally by 
conducting a t-test on the difference between the values for DISPERSE for the JSE and the Xetra over the 
two periods, the null hypothesis of no change cannot be rejected (with a p-value of the test of 0.40).  
Overall, while there is some surface evidence of a reduction in DISPERSE on the JSE that is not seen on 
Xetra following the change in exchange fees, it is not supported by statistical testing.  
4.4.5 Daily High-Low Range (HI_LO) 
Following an identical approach used in TRADE_VALUE, aggregate and individual t-tests were conducted 
on HI_LO values with a null hypothesis (Ho) of no change. The results are shown for the JSE and Xetra 
markets in Tables 4.11 and 4.12 respectively.  As can be seen from the tables, the JSE shows some evidence 
of a reduction in HI_LO range for the important large capitalisation sector.  However, this same 
improvement is also seen in Xetra stocks (which has the higher power of the test) and hence cannot be 
attributed solely to the change in JSE exchange fees.  Overall, the results for HI_LO appear consistent with 
a view that the change in exchange fees did not directly impact on levels of market volatility. However, 
other variables may have caused a narrowing of the high-low range over the second-half of the period 
investigated.  
 Table 4.11: HI_LO for JSE Stocks  
Overall Total Main Board Alt-X  
Mean (Pre / Post) 3.20% / 
3.22% 
3.03% / 
3.02% 
5.56% / 
5.83% 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 0.426% / 
0.385% 
0.406% / 
0.348% 
2.558% / 
2.546% 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) No No Yes* 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 29.25% 29.37% 28.13% 
Of which Improvement 59.18% 61.80% 33.33% 
Market Cap (Mln ZAR) 1707220-
20052 
20051-4304 4303-1162 1161-197 196-5 
Mean (Pre / Post) 2.70% / 
2.53% 
2.90% / 
2.84% 
2.89% / 
2.84% 
2.99% / 
3.37% 
5.60% / 
5.65% 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 0.512% / 
0.409% 
0.484% / 
0.414% 
0.641% / 
0.456% 
0.588% / 
0.653% 
1.972% / 
1.717% 
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T-statistic (Reject Ho) Yes* No No Yes** No 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 42% 36% 25% 27% 16% 
Of which Improvement 86% 63% 41% 39% 45% 
 Stock Price (ZA Cents) 93625-7151 7150-1921 1920-573 572-124 123-1 
Mean (Pre / Post) 2.50% / 
2.37% 
2.92% / 
2.86% 
2.57% / 
2.46% 
3.38% / 
3.40% 
5.31% / 
5.68% 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 0.426% / 
0.416% 
0.459% / 
0.421% 
0.769% / 
0.428% 
0.752% / 
0.695% 
1.463% / 
1.591% 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) Yes* No No No No 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 45% 30% 21% 21% 30% 
Of which Improvement 80% 65% 43% 57% 35% 
Data sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service.  Yes* indicates significance at the 5% level and Yes** indicates significance at the 1% 
or better level. 
 
Table 4.12: HI_LO for Xetra Stocks 
Overall Total Regulated Open  
Mean (Pre / Post) 4.89% / 
4.84% 
4.41% / 
4.41% 
6.55% / 
6.32% 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 0.297% / 
0.380% 
0.291% / 
0.636% 
0.598% / 
0.432% 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) No No Yes** 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 43.88% 41.29% 52.14% 
Of which Improvement 65.12% 63.64% 68.85% 
Market Cap (Mln EUR) 1103600-
18001 
18000-2521 2520-797 796-284 283-10 
Mean (Pre / Post) 2.54% / 
2.33% 
3.18% / 
3.09% 
4.71% / 
4.72% 
5.41% / 
5.48% 
9.24% / 
9.13% 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 0.379% / 
0.432% 
0.342% / 
0.426% 
0.475% / 
0.641% 
0.458% / 
0.617% 
0.770% / 
0.759% 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) Yes** No No No No 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 35% 41% 48% 43% 53% 
Of which Improvement 91% 63% 60% 57% 62% 
Stock Price (EUR) 606.35-33.01 33.00-14.26 14.25-5.09 5.08-2.176 2.175-0.01 
Mean (Pre / Post) 2.67% / 
2.43% 
3.25% / 
3.14% 
3.84% / 
3.76% 
5.31% / 
5.41% 
9.80% / 
9.81% 
Std Dev (Pre / Post) 0.381% / 
0.371% 
0.356% / 
0.406% 
0.391% / 
0.392% 
0.427% / 
0.508% 
0.797% / 
1.005% 
T-statistic (Reject Ho) Yes** Yes* No No No 
Individual Reject Ho (% of total) 41% 45% 37% 51% 46% 
Of which Improvement 88% 59% 69% 50% 64% 
Data sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service.  Yes* indicates significance at the 5% level and Yes** indicates significance at the 1% 
or better level. 
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4.5 Results for Market Integrity Measures (MARKET_MANIP) 
The data for both the JSE and Xetra was scanned to identify any potential incidents of manipulation on 
daily closing prices. After removing incidents that may be explained by news stories, the final number of 
net incidents is shown in Table 4.13 for the JSE, and in Table 4.14 for the Xetra market. One important 
feature of the JSE data should be mentioned.  There were a large number of identified incidents on both 
the 24th of December and the 31st of December in the South African market.  These specific dates are the 
only two shortened (half) trading days on the annual JSE trading calendar. Volumes in both days are 
typically very poor.  This can be seen in the overall value traded data for each day, with just over R2.2bln 
trading on the 24th of December 2013 and just over R3.1bln trading on the 31st of December 2013.  This 
compares with an average figure for 2013 of approximately R15.8bln per day. The low levels of value 
traded would suggest that the strong clustering of MARKET_MANIP on these two days could have arisen 
from the very low level of trade activity, or equally, from an increased opportunity for manipulation. 
Irrespective, it seems reasonable to exclude these two specific days from the results as unique outliers, 
as there are no such equivalent extreme low-volume days in the pre-event period.  By contrast, no such 
pattern exists for the Xetra market, which is closed on both the 24th and the 31st of December (equally, 
there was no other specific dates on the Xetra, like the 23rd of December, that showed any sign of 
clustering of incidents).  
In total, there are an exactly equal number of net incidents on the JSE in the two time periods.  However, 
when we exclude the two half-days in December, the picture is very different. What is also clear from the 
data is that the majority of the MARKET_MANIP incidents on the 24th and the 31st of December occurred 
within the smaller stocks on both a price and market capitalisation basis.  Amongst the larger cap stocks, 
there is a clear reduction of MARKET_MANIP events in the post-period. 
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 Table 4.13: MARKET_MANIP for JSE Stocks 
 Overall Total Main Alt-X  
 
 
 
Prior 61 60 1 
Post / Excl half days 61 / 36 55 /34 6 / 2 
Market Cap (Mln ZAR) 1707220-
20052 
20051-
4304 
4303-
1162 
1161-197 196-5 
Prior 18 12 19 7 5 
Post / Excl half days 6 / 6 16 / 14 15 / 7 17 / 6 7 / 3 
Stock Price (ZA Cents) 93625-7151 7150-1921 1920-573 572-124 123-1 
Prior 14 17 13 9 8 
Post / Excl half days 10 / 9 14 / 12 16 / 7 10 / 5 11 / 3 
Data sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service.   
The picture from the Xetra looks quite different from the JSE.  There is actually an overall tick-up in the 
number of MARKET_MANIP events in the post-change period.  Further, much of this increase came from 
the stocks with the highest prices and market capitalisation – in direct contrast to the experience on the 
JSE. Overall, this would seem to support a view that the change in exchange billing may have reduced 
levels of market manipulation on the exchange.  
 Table 4.14: MARKET_MANIP for Xetra Stocks  
 Overall Total Reg. Open  
 
 
Prior 69 45 24 
Post  75 56 19 
Market Cap (Mln EUR) 1103600-
18001 
18000-
2521 
2520-797 796-284 283-10 
Prior 4 17 13 19 16 
Post 13 21 13 14 14 
Stock Price (EUR) 606.35-
33.01 
33.00-
14.26 
14.25-
5.09 
5.08-
2.176 
2.175-0.01 
Prior 8 16 14 19 12 
Post 18 9 16 18 14 
Data sourced from the Bloomberg Professional service. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the statistical analysis conducted to examine metrics of market 
quality on the JSE following the change in exchange fee billing methodology. The German Xetra market 
was selected for comparison purposes as the DAX index had the highest correlation of weekly local 
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currency price returns with the South African All-Share index. Each market was characterised by a long-
tail of fairly low priced, small cap stocks with low levels of trading activity.   
Investigation into metrics of market efficiency found little clear evidence of any overall improvement. 
Realised spreads showed significant instability across periods, making any clear inferences difficult.  
However, there did seem to be some evidence of a reduction of transaction costs amongst the largest 
stocks by market capitalisation. Amihud’s Measure of Liquidity suggested little change in liquidity, and 
there is no statistical support for any change in the speed in which prices reflect new information. There 
was little evidence of any change in the average value of each trade or the daily high-low range. Market 
integrity did seem to be improved by reducing the number of potential incidents of market manipulation, 
after removing the results from the 24th and 31st of December. The following chapter provides the 
conclusions of the study.   
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a discussion of the findings and draws out the conclusions of the study.  It begins in 
5.2 with a discussion of the findings in relation to the existing literature.  This is followed by section 5.3 
which provides the conclusion and possible directions for future research.  
5.2 Discussion 
This study investigated how a change in the fees charged by the JSE onto members to trade stocks affected 
various metrics of market quality.  This topic falls within the broader subject of market microstructure, 
which considers how frictions in trading can affect both the costs and behaviour of investors. More 
specifically, using the framework suggest by Madhavan (2000), it primarily relates to the issues of market 
structure and design, along with the issues of price discovery and price formation. While the subject of 
exchange fees does not appear to have attracted previous studies (to the authors best knowledge), work 
in related areas has shown that changes in market design can affect overall market efficiency and integrity. 
The final results of this work does seem to provide partial corroboration with previous studies such as 
Chordia et al (2008) in finding some identifiable changes in a limited subset of metrics of market quality 
as a consequence of the change.  A feature of this study is that stocks with large market capitalisations 
exhibit more signs of potential improvement in market quality than was evident in small cap stocks. 
One aspect in which this study does differ with other empirical studies is in the area of transaction costs. 
When immediate transaction costs are measured by BID_ASK, the overall pattern of spreads is too volatile 
over the several weekly periods measured to be useful in drawing any overall conclusions about the 
influence of exchange fees.   This looks to be the result of other exogenous factors driving South African 
bid-ask spreads. This differs from the experience of Hollifield et al (2004) who found stable bid-ask spreads 
over similar short-term horizons on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. It also contrasts with Chordia et al 
(2008) who found that a change in another element of market design (tick size) resulted in lower bid/ask 
spreads.  The use of HI_LO to capture any possible changes in longer-term implicit transaction costs 
presents a different dilemma, with no notable changes being identified. However, it is worth noting that 
the measurement of transaction costs in other studies is often done using effective or realised spreads, 
and so represents a very different frequency of data. 
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It is also worth highlighting the difference in the results of this study to those of Duong & Kalev (2014).  
The stability of the liquidity metrics that use volume data (ILLIQUID and TRADE_VALUE) are the exact 
opposite findings to the afore-mentioned study.  However, the Duong & Kalev study analyses a very 
different event (change from an attributed to an anonymous market) and uses a different metric (slope 
of the order book).  
Algorithmic trading and HFT are topics that are presently getting a lot of attention from both market 
participants and academic scholars. This study has not directly investigated this area.  However, the 
segmentation by market capitalisation does provide some interesting read-through. Stocks with a higher 
market capitalisation typically evidence higher levels of trade and are more suited to these types of 
automated electronic trading systems. The evidence across the metrics of market efficiency suggests 
higher levels of liquidity and tighter spreads amongst higher market capitalisation stocks following the 
change in exchange fees.  Following from the results of Hendershott et al (2011), this may imply an 
increase in the volume of general algorithmic trading post the change in exchange fees.  It could also 
suggest an increased presence of liquidity-providing HFT strategies after the change.  
5.3 Conclusion 
Overall, the findings point to an improvement in market integrity by reducing the incidents of market 
manipulation.  There is also some evidence that realised bid/ask spreads narrowed for the larger and most 
liquid stocks, implying lower implicit transaction costs. 
In answer to the specific research questions posed in chapter one, the following findings are relevant.  The 
change in the JSE billing model appears to have reduced implicit transaction costs for immediacy in the 
largest and most actively traded pool of stocks on the JSE. However, there is no evidence of any reduction 
in transaction costs for other stocks.  Further, the instability of bid/ask spreads over different weekly 
periods implies that investors constantly face significant uncertainty around the immediate cost of 
execution. For institutional investors, transaction costs for larger sized orders that cannot be executed 
quickly appears unchanged when measured by the daily high-low range. With regards to the level of 
market liquidity, the hypothesis that liquidity was unchanged before and after the change in exchange fee 
billing cannot be rejected. There is also no statistical support to suggest that market prices more quickly 
reflect market information after the change. Finally, market integrity does appear to have improved post 
the change with a significant reduction in incidents of market manipulation observed (after excluding 
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shortened, highly illiquid trading days). This reduction occurred against a backdrop of an increase in events 
in the comparable Xetra market over the same period.         
Several potential areas for further research have been identified.  The instability of the realised bid/ask 
spreads over the weekly time frames implies investors face uncertainty over the level of implicit 
transaction costs at any given point in time. Deeper analysis on what drives these changes in spread and 
possible ways that market design can improve stability could lead to enhanced market quality by reducing 
this uncertainty.  The strong clustering feature of incidents of market manipulation over the two half-
trading days on the JSE also seems deserving of greater attention. Identification of what underlies this 
anomaly, and if it appears consistently over a number of years, could provide new evidence of a type of 
seasonality in trading activity. Finally, while the volume of trade done by algorithmic and HFT systems was 
not investigated in this study, it may prove fruitful to determine if there was any change in the overall 
incidence of such activity pre- and post the change that can explain the stronger improvements in market 
quality identified amongst larger market-capitalisation stocks.  
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APPENDIX A: JSE Market Notice 
Market Notice 
Number: 136 
Date 01 July 2013 
JSE Equity Market Transaction Billing Model Methodology Change Notice 
 
As members are aware, the JSE embarked on an extensive consultative process to review the Equity 
Market Trading Fee Billing Model, which concluded during June 2013 where the JSE finally proposed a 
0.0053% value based charge with a maximum fee per transaction leg of R350. 
 
The above parameters were based on certain assumptions the JSE made with regards to a potential 
reduction in OP and OD reported transactions. The feedback from members during June 2013 resulted in 
slightly revised assumptions for OP and OD reported transaction reductions. 
 
Taking all of the above into account, the JSE has decided that as from 30 September 2013, the existing 
hybrid billing model will be replaced with a value based billing model with no minimum charge and a 
maximum charge (excluding VAT) as follows: 
Charge Ceiling 
                                                                       Charge    Ceiling 
Equities (including all boards and products) 0.0053%   R 300 
 
This notice should also be regarded as formal notice in terms of clause 4.7 of the JSE Limited Services 
Agreement of the change in the equity market transaction billing model which will come into effect on 30 
September 2013. It should be noted that this notice is not applicable to the Namibia Stock Exchange and 
its members. 
 
The JSE will be hosting a communication session on Thursday 4 July 2013 where feedback from the 
June 2013 market consultation will be provided. 
 
Should you require any additional information or clarification on the billing model please contact Suhagna 
Mansura on (011) 520 7738 or at SuhagnaM@jse.co.za or you are also welcome to contact me. 
Leanne Parsons 
Designation Director: Equity Market 
Division Equity Market Division 
Tel +27 11 520 7340 
Fax +27 11 520 8340 
E-mail address: leannep@jse.co.za 
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APPENDIX B: Relative Return Dispersion Charts (DISPERSE) 
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